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TECHNICAL
 MEMORANDUM
 ORO-T-28 (FEC)

**FEC PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
 OPERATIONS: INTELLIGENCE**

By

John Ponturo
 Willmoore Kendall

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED

By authority of CR&D - 21 Aug 59
Re Mem 59-39
 By CA Guomall
 Date 6 Oct 59

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Received: 28 April 1952

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HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
APO 500

AG 461 (17 Dec 52)GC-0

17 December 1952

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Operations Research Office
Technical Memorandum ORO-T-28 (FEC)

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED

By authority of CRFD 21 Aug 59
Re Memo 59-39
By CA Summell
Date 6 Oct 59

TO: The Adjutant General
Department of the Army
Washington 25, D. C.
Attention: Assistant Chief of Staff, G3

1. Reference: Letter, AG 461 (2 Oct 52)GC-0, Headquarters, Far East Command, 2 October 1952, subject: Letter of Transmittal of Technical Memorandum ORO-T-28 (FEC).

2. Two hundred fifty (250) copies of this letter are forwarded for attachment to subject technical memorandum in compliance with Department of the Army letter, G3 040 ORO (6 Feb 52), subject: Distribution of Publications of the Department of the Army Operations Research Office (ORO), 7 February 1952.

3. Technical Memorandum ORO-T-28 (FEC) is a study made during the period August thru December 1951, designed to describe, analyze, and evaluate theater-level psywar intelligence operations in the Far East Command. The study brings to light many complex problems encountered in planning psywar intelligence organization and some of the difficulties inherent in the collection, processing and utilization of intelligence for profitable use by Psywar.

4. As indicated in the specific comments attached herewith, the soundness of the conclusions drawn in the study is questionable. Since completion of this study the Intelligence Division, PsyWar Section, Headquarters Far East Command, has been reorganized; consequently, for the most part, the conclusions and recommendations as they pertain to the present organization and functions of PsyWar Intelligence are obsolete.

5. Specific comments on subject document are presented in Inclosure 1.

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AG 461 (17 Dec 52)AG-C

17 December 1952

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Operations Research Office Technical
Memorandum ORO-T-28 (PEC)

6. Copies of this letter and the comments of interested subordinate commands and staff sections of Headquarters, Far East Command have been furnished the Director of Operations Research Office, Far East Command.

FOR THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

C. C. B. Warden

C. C. B. WARDEN
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

1 Incl
Specific Comments
on TM ORO-T-28 (PEC)

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SPECIFIC COMMENTS

1. The following are specific comments on the conclusions as stated in paragraphs 1 thru 10, pages 2 and 3 of ORO-T-28 (FEC):

a. Paragraph 1: Do not concur. A great volume of material is received and scanned for information of psychological warfare value; however, only publications and reports believed to be of psywar interest are subscribed to on a continuing basis. Requirements for information are under continuous review and discontinuance of publications and reports is effected when documents are found unprofitable to psywar purposes. The collection of "every scrap of intelligence that it can obtain" implies the gathering of source materials without regard to usefulness which is not and has not been practiced.

b. Paragraphs 2, 3, 5 and 6. The Effectiveness Summary, the Weekly Analysis of Enemy Vulnerabilities, the Daily Collation Summary, and the Research Notes and Memoranda have been discontinued in the format observed by the authors and have been superseded by other analyses and reports considered more appropriate to current psywar operations. The PsyWar Intelligence Division currently publishes a Weekly Intelligence Summary designed to provide interested agencies with an evaluation of significant elements of information collected during the period. With the exception of research notes, data formerly disseminated thru the media mentioned above are incorporated in the summary. A portion of the document is devoted to an analysis of the effectiveness of specific themes utilized in psywar propaganda during the week. Also to assist in determining the effectiveness of various themes propounded, measures have been taken to establish civilian and prisoner of war testing panels which comment on the potential value and feasibility of their use. In addition to being included in the summary, enemy vulnerabilities are made the subject of special studies whenever the situation warrants. The research notes and memoranda have been replaced by the "Research Review", published by the Operations Research Section, 1st Radio Broadcast and Leaflet Group.

c: Paragraph 4: Do not concur. It is possible that the authors did not realize fully the use that has been made of the charts concerning the frequency distribution of themes in foreign broadcast. In addition to their use by psywar planners, the charts serve a purpose for G2, Far East Command in that they are published in the Theater Daily Intelligence Summary and in the G2 Intelligence Digest, both documents receiving wide distribution. In addition, the reports are utilized extensively by the UNC Armistice delegation.

d. Paragraph 7: This conclusion cannot be accepted in its entirety. It is believed that procedures followed at the time of this study were adequate, however, means of improvement are continuously

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Incl 1

Specific Comments (Cont'd)

sought. Since completion of the study certain weaknesses in the organization and functions of the PsyWar Intelligence Division have been recognized and appropriate measures have been taken to rectify the shortcomings.

e. Paragraph 8: Do not concur. It is considered that additional intelligence desired can be obtained by furnishing G2 the specific requirements; G2 has the necessary collection agencies. There is no indication included in the study as to what collection activities, agencies, or means the authors have in mind. The "development of additional collection activities" might result in wasteful duplication of the G2 effort.

f. Paragraph 9: Do not concur. It is considered that the PsyWar Section has stated its needs and that the fullest cooperation has been obtained from G2.

g. Paragraph 10: Concur in the desirability of obtaining maximum coordination. It is considered that the need for teamwork and coordination is recognized and practiced in the present organization and operations of the various agencies of PsyWar Section.

2. The following are specific comments on the recommendations as stated in paragraph 1 to 10 inclusive, pages 3 and 4 of the Technical Memorandum.

a. Paragraph 1: Concur. Continuous study is given to this subject by PsyWar Intelligence personnel.

b. Paragraph 2: It is considered that close contact is maintained between G2 Section, Headquarters, Far East Command and PsyWar Intelligence.

c. Paragraphs 3, 4 and 6: See paragraph 1 b, above.

d. Paragraph 5: Concur in part. Psywar analysis of enemy broadcasts is restricted to coverage of output of China, North Korea and the USSR. Inclusion of the latter is not in accord with the authors' recommendation, but monitoring of the USSR broadcast by PsyWar Intelligence is considered desirable in order to provide PsyWar with a first hand comparison of output emanating from the three locales of primary interest to the Far East Command. Analysis of foreign broadcasts are now presented under the heading of languages for target groups rather than by the place of origin of the broadcast. The interpretation of shifts of emphasis in foreign broadcasts is a responsibility of PsyWar Intelligence.

e. Paragraph 7: Concur. Files have been rearranged and

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Specific Comments (Cont'd)

indexed for greater usefulness.

f. Paragraph 8: Concur. Researchers and other interested psywar personnel have free access to intelligence material. As mentioned above, the research notes and memoranda formerly prepared by PsyWar Intelligence have been discontinued. Their content is now included in the Research Review which is published by the Operations and Research Section, 1st Radio Broadcast and Leaflet Group.

g. Paragraph 9: Concur. PsyWar Intelligence Division and the Operations and Research Section, 1st Radio Broadcast and Leaflet Group, function as integral parts of their organizations and cooperate fully through personal contact and technical communications.

i. Paragraph 10: Concur. Basic background data on the target groups are being collected to the widest possible extent. Analysts are instructed therein and are assisted in the use of such data.

3. The following are specific comments on other portions of the Technical Memorandum.

a. News Publications (Pages 12 and 13): Concur in general. The statement that no archives of newspapers or files of clippings are being maintained is considered inaccurate since such files have been maintained by the Intelligence Division.

b. News Releases (Page 13): With reference to the collection efforts of the Operations and Research Section, 1st Radio Broadcast and Leaflet Group, the authors' statements generally apply. With reference to the Intelligence Division, PsyWar, however, the discussion indicates an apparent misconception of PsyWar functions. It is not the mission of PsyWar to operate psywar media, but to plan and supervise such operations. The collection of information by the Intelligence Division, PsyWar, is therefore geared to the needs of the planners rather than that of the operators.

c. Radio Messages (Page 13): The description of the type of radio messages received is generally accurate. In discussing the use made of these messages, however, comments are apparently predicated on the assumption that PsyWar is operational, i.e., primarily interested in preparing releases. In this respect, it should be pointed out that the preparation of releases is a function of the operating agencies, primarily the 1st Radio Broadcast and Leaflet Group, whose Operations and Research Section assists news writers in assembling necessary data.

d. Prisoner of War Interrogation Reports (Page 14): The description of the type of reports received is generally correct, although

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Specific Comments (Cont'd)

the organizations conducting the interrogations have since been re-designated. The description of the information sought from interrogation reports omits reference to data extracted from this source which forms a profile of the enemy soldier. The time-lag between interrogations by G2 agencies and receipt of reports in the Intelligence Division has been reduced to four days.

e. Agents Reports (Page 15): Field Research Unit, FEC reports form only a small portion of the agent reports received, whereas the agencies controlled by the Far East Command Liaison Group furnish the bulk. The statements as to content and area coverage of the various reports are not entirely accurate, but because of the highly classified nature of this subject further discussion is omitted. Since PsyWar is increasingly emphasizing its strategic objective in rear areas, this type of report is becoming more and more important.

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THIS IS A WORKING PAPER

Presenting the considered results of study by the ORO staff members responsible for its preparation. The findings and analysis are subject to revision as may be required by new facts or by modification of basic assumptions. Comments and criticism of the contents are invited. Remarks should be addressed to:

The Director
Operations Research Office
The Johns Hopkins University
6410 Connecticut Avenue
Chevy Chase, Maryland

ORO**abstract****FEC PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OPERATIONS: INTELLIGENCE**

by

*John Ponturo
Willmoore Kendall*

How efficient are the intelligence operations of psychological warfare in FEC? How valuable, in relation to its time and personnel costs, is the contribution of intelligence output to the current psywar campaign in Korea? In this memorandum, ORO has described and analyzed the theater-level psywar intelligence operations – from the processing of many sources of information to the issuance of various types of reports to psywar operators.

To meet the operator's working needs for information, psywar intelligence should progressively reach beyond the selection and purveying of items of information and provide more interpretation and evaluation.

- Such efforts would increase the psywar yield of each source and increase the practical usefulness of intelligence reports.

In general, operational efficiency would benefit from increasingly intensive internal communications within the psywar organization, with increased access by

- operators to intelligence files for reference purposes and with increased contact between intelligence producers and intelligence users, the writers of leaflets and scripts.

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Technical Memorandum ORO-T-28(FEC)

FEC
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OPERATIONS:
INTELLIGENCE

by

John Ponturo
Willmoore Kendall

Received: 28 April 1952

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SUMMARY

PROBLEM

To describe, analyze, and evaluate psywar intelligence operations in theater-level psychological warfare in FEC.

FACTS

This study is one of a series of five presenting an over-all view of the organization of US psychological warfare in the Korean War; the others are ORO-T-17 (FEC) on Eighth Army psywar, ORO-T-20 (FEC) on radio operations, ORO-T-21 (FEC) on leaflet operations, and ORO-T-27 (FEC) on theater staff organization.

The series incorporates results of ORO research in Korea and Japan conducted from early August to late December 1951. Data were gathered from psywar reports, records, and documents, interviews with participants in psywar operations, and observation of the operations themselves. Each study in the series has been presented in the light of its relationship to the entire campaign, but has been reported as a separate memorandum to facilitate use by readers with specialized psywar interests.

DISCUSSION

"Psywar intelligence," for the purposes of this memorandum, consists of whatever intelligence is demonstrably required for the rational conduct of the psywar campaign in the Korean War, as discerned in the campaign's day-to-day operations.

Responsibility for providing psywar intelligence in FEC is divided between the Intelligence Division of the Psychological Warfare Section (PWS, GHQ) and the Research and Development Section of the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group (R&D Section, 1st RB&L Group). The PWS Intelligence Division conducts the major psywar intelligence operations. R&D functions mainly as a reference service in support of propaganda preparation activities.

The Intelligence Division receives and processes a large volume of documentary materials, including news publications,

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press releases, radio messages, prisoner of war interrogation reports, agent reports, intelligence summaries, foreign radio broadcast reports, translations of captured enemy documents, and miscellaneous reports and documents. Most of the material in these documents was collected, originally, with an eye to needs and purposes other than those of psywar.

Psywar intelligence items are selected from the traditional intelligence contained in the source materials and processed in terms of their suitability for any one of four types of document: summaries of psywar effectiveness, summaries of enemy vulnerabilities, analyses of foreign radio broadcasts, and the "Daily Collation Summary," (which summarizes the entire range of PWS psywar intelligence). These documents represent the bulk of the Division's output.

Intelligence personnel offer additional contributions to the planning and execution of FEC psywar operations: the participation of the Chief of the Intelligence Division in weekly planning conferences, the preparation of "research notes" and research memoranda by the R&D Section of the 1st RB&L Group, and the work of the target selection officer of the PWS Intelligence Division.

CONCLUSIONS

1. PWS Intelligence receives, on a recurring basis, every scrap of intelligence that it can obtain, and continues to process the entire flow from each source by routinized methods. The amount of effort expended on each type of source material does not appear to be directly related to any clear criteria of psywar intelligence value except as individual analysts make their own adjustments under pressure of work.

2. PWS Intelligence's weekly summaries of psywar effectiveness give PWS the repeated assurance that its operations produce discernible results, but they are based on methods that do not yield technically precise data on the effectiveness of specific themes, on effectiveness in producing other behavior effects than surrender, or on effects obtained against civilians in enemy territory.

3. The weekly analysis of enemy vulnerabilities is essentially an information-collecting program. Its technique has not yet been brought to the point of assessing the general situation as to enemy vulnerability, comparing the present with the past in trend terms, anticipating future developments, or relating vulnerability data to specific enemy units.

4. PWS Intelligence also produces charts on the frequency distribution of themes in foreign broadcasts and reports concerning trends in foreign broadcast content. The charts offer elementary or summary analysis of foreign broadcast content. The trend reports provide PWS planners with accounts of enemy propaganda treatment of

[REDACTED]

events or phases in the war and make it possible for planners to have a good impression of what the enemy is saying. The ORO field team was unable to satisfy itself that the actual use made of these reports was sufficient to justify the considerable expenditure of effort involved.

5. The Daily Collation Summary (DCS) exploits all intelligence sources available to the Division and levies on the time and effort of all Division personnel, to a greater extent than any other product. In character the DCS is primarily a collection summary rather than analytic. Here again the ORO team was unable to satisfy itself that the effect of the DCS on psywar operations was worth the cost.

6. The research notes and research memoranda apparently offer definite value as far as they go, to FEC's propaganda writers and planners, and appear indispensable for the proper conduct of psywar. The preparation of these materials was, however, somewhat isolated from the rest of the operation, in a unit which did not have automatic access to all available sources.

7. Support for psywar intelligence from its regular intelligence process appears inadequate as yet, despite the contributions of the Chief of Intelligence to the PWS planning conferences and the potential contributions of the new target selection officer.

8. Some of the major deficiencies of psywar intelligence, as regards meeting the needs of the planners and operators, lie outside the direct control of the PWS Intelligence Division, and would require the development of additional collection activities, which would have to be designed to meet well defined requirements.

9. PWS Intelligence had not yet reached a satisfactory level in identifying psywar intelligence needs so that the top-level psywar administrators could negotiate effectively to obtain the help required. This definition of needs is a task which can be performed only within PWS, and only if responsibility is clearly recognized and assigned.

10. The relations between the PWS Intelligence staff and the rest of PWS appear rather too distant or attenuated, so that the intelligence personnel do not get as clear a picture of the needs, wishes, and problems of the planners and operators as might be helpful, while the latter in turn do not fully understand the capabilities of intelligence to serve them. As a result the intelligence products are probably not yet as useful as they could be, and at the same time, the planners and operators do not come to intelligence for specific help as often as they might.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Regular consideration should be given by PWS Intelligence to the need for concentrating its analytic work on sources that offer a fairly good yield of valuable material.

[REDACTED]

2. More frequent and intensive working contacts between PWS Intelligence staff and G-2 FEC officers should be developed.

3. PWS should re-examine its summaries on psywar effectiveness and consider whether they could be abandoned and replaced by some more useful product, or modified so as to provide more useful conclusions to psywar planners and operators.

4. Efforts should be made to develop the study of enemy vulnerabilities to a point that goes beyond the collection of items of data and toward an analytic picture of the enemy's state of mind.

5. The analysis of the content of enemy broadcasts should be sharpened in focus, perhaps by restricting it to cover Chinese and North Korean broadcasts only; the classification of items should be systematized; charts presenting the results should be designed, if possible, to indicate what the Korean audience is hearing from all sources; and the initial interpretation of shifts of emphasis should be made a responsibility of the Division.

6. The plan of the Daily Collation Summary should be re-examined. So far as possible, the criteria for selecting items for inclusion should be sharpened. Evaluation and interpretation might well be carried beyond the straight reporting level.

7. PWS Intelligence files should be arranged for greatest usefulness for reference purposes, and should be indexed.

8. The production of research notes and research memoranda should be strongly encouraged. Researchers should be given full access to intelligence materials.

9. Communications between PWS Intelligence personnel and the 1st RB&L Group, R&D, intelligence personnel, and between planning and operating personnel, should be intensified.

10. PWS should endeavor to collect basic background materials relating to the cultural and psychological characteristics of the target audience, and analysts should be instructed and helped to become acquainted with them and assisted in their use.

[REDACTED]



FEC PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OPERATIONS: INTELLIGENCE





INTRODUCTION

This memorandum describes, analyzes, and evaluates psywar intelligence operations in theater-level psychological warfare in FEC, and offers suggestions for consideration when planning and conducting such future operations in the Far East theater and elsewhere. It is one of a series of five presenting an over-all view of the psywar campaign in Korea. Data were gathered in Korea and Japan from August to December 1951, and were obtained from psywar reports, records, and documents, interviews with psywar operators, and observation of the operations themselves.

MEANING OF PSYWAR INTELLIGENCE

Throughout this memorandum, "psywar intelligence" is given an operational definition. It is assumed, in other words, that "psywar intelligence" is that intelligence for which need arises in the course of planning and conducting psywar operations. If, for example, the planners or operators in a given psywar campaign need to know the influence of Korean topography upon radio broadcasting, the inflationary tendencies in the Chinese economy, the curriculum of Korean grammar schools, or even the curse-words current in the North Korean armed forces and the reaction of Chinese soldiers to snakes and spiders, data relevant to these topics thereby become the business of psywar intelligence, which, properly speaking, should acquire new business in no other way. It follows from this definition, furthermore, that the proper subject matter of psywar intelligence necessarily varies from one psywar campaign to another, to the extent that different campaigns, with different objectives, in different military situations, or employing different media or techniques, call for supporting intelligence that involves different types of information and different types of intelligence product. The definition is deliberately devised to avoid the current tendency to lump together, under the term psywar intelligence, everything it would be "nice" for psywar operators to know.

For the purposes of this memorandum, "psywar intelligence" accordingly consists of whatever intelligence is demonstrably required for the rational conduct of the current psywar campaign in the Korean War, as discerned in that campaign's day-to-day

[REDACTED]

operations, and should not be conceived except in terms of those operations. This is not to imply that the kind of intelligence produced does not, in fact, influence the kind of campaign waged, but rather to say that the kind of campaign should dictate the kind of intelligence, and that any definition of "psywar intelligence" should always be related to the specific psywar operations it is expected to serve. This memorandum takes as its reference in this connection the description and analysis of the FEC psywar campaign provided in recent ORO studies: especially ORO-T-20 (FEC), "FEC Psychological Warfare Operations: Radio," and ORO-T-21 (FEC), "FEC Psychological Warfare Operations: Leaflets."

This memorandum further assumes that "psywar intelligence," in the sense intended above, is not only different from traditional military intelligence, but different enough to require different forms of planning and different types of personnel in its production.

ORGANIZATION OF PSYWAR INTELLIGENCE WITHIN GHQ, FEC

The agencies responsible for theater-level psychological warfare in the present phase of the Korean War are the Psychological Warfare Section (PWS), GHQ, FEC, and the First Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group (1st RB&L Group), 8239th Army Unit, GHQ, FEC.

PWS, which is responsible for making policy, formulating plans, and supervising operations, is a special staff section monitored by G-3 and reporting to the Chief of Staff.¹ The 1st RB&L Group, which is responsible for conducting theater-level psywar operations, is formally assigned to Headquarters and Service Command, under the operational control of PWS.² Each of these two agencies has its own intelligence unit.

The major intelligence operations in FEC psywar are conducted by the Intelligence and Evaluation Division within PWS, shown in Fig. 1. The Division is charged with responsibility for collecting, processing, producing, and disseminating intelligence for psychological warfare.³

In executing its mission, the Division uses a staff of 15 persons, as follows: a Division Chief (lieutenant-colonel), a target-selection officer (major), a translator (GS-8), eight intelligence research analysts (one captain, one E-6, two GS-11, four GS-9), two research analyst clerks (GS-5), and two clerk-typists (GS-3).

Four of the analysts, two analyst clerks, and one clerk-typist make up the Research Group, which is formally assigned the following tasks: (1) Evaluate and interpret information obtained from

¹ General Orders No. 157, GHQ, FEC, dated 17 June 1951. For a detailed account of the development and present organization of PWS, see ORO-T-27.

² General Orders No. 61, Headquarters and Service Command, 1951.

³ PWS organizational and functional chart, July 1951, prepared for internal use.




Fig. 1—Organization of the Psychological Warfare Section, GHQ, FEC.

interviews, interrogation reports, and documents; (2) Seek indications of the status of the enemy's morale, such as his psychological strengths and weaknesses (or "vulnerabilities"); (3) Analyze enemy propaganda and psywar operations, in search of materials likely to be of use for counter propaganda; and (4) Prepare estimates of the probable effectiveness of proposed psywar plans.⁴

Four of the analysts and one clerk-typist make up the Radio Trends Group, which is assigned the following tasks: (1) Evaluate and classify intercepts of foreign radio broadcasts in the area of the Far East; (2) Identify trends in the themes and subject matter of those broadcasts; (3) Analyze and interpret those broadcasts in the context of other available intelligence, and (4) Prepare appropriate reports for study by PWS's staff.⁴

The Division's target-selection officer, a recent addition to the staff, is responsible for providing information on targets for leaflet operations in North Korea. The task of the translator is to translate enemy documents relating to enemy psywar, including enemy psywar materials (leaflets, handbills, posters).

A subsidiary or supporting role in FEC psywar intelligence is performed by the Research and Development Section of the 1st RB&L Group, shown in Fig. 2.

R&D responsibilities, unlike those of PWS Intelligence, have never been formally defined. Furthermore, the way in which intelligence functions are to be divided between PWS Intelligence and R&D has not yet been finally established. As of this writing (January

⁴ *Loc. cit.*





Fig. 2—Organization of the First Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, 8239th Army Unit, GHQ, FEC.

1951), however, certain apparent conflicts of assignment and certain potential duplications of functions have been reduced by tacit understandings between the two. These, as already noted, assign R&D a relatively minor role in intelligence collection, analysis, and evaluation. It confines itself, for the most part, to intelligence research, although, as noted in the next paragraph, the word "intelligence" is not used, either in the Group or in the Section, in referring to its activities.

R&D's central task, as stated both by its own officers and by those in position to give them directives, is to conduct research in support of "operations" or "output." In practice, this appears to confine R&D to the conduct of "Ask Mr. Foster" research, i.e. background research on spot requests, mainly from leaflet and radio writers, or on proposed propaganda themes. R&D is, therefore, mainly a reference service in support of propaganda preparation activities.

R&D has a personnel complement of 22 persons: 5 officers, 14 enlisted men, and 3 civilians. The officer-in-charge is a captain, his assistant a first lieutenant. The director of research is also a first lieutenant. The Section is also assigned a second lieutenant, a warrant officer, junior grade, four sergeants, four corporals, six privates, and three ungraded civilians. R&D as an organization, and R&D personnel with respect to their day-to-day activities, are not in any sense under the direct control of PWS Intelligence.

The present memorandum will concentrate attention upon PWS Intelligence, because it largely determines the kinds of intelligence that FEC psywar uses in its conduct of day-to-day operations. R&D activities will be treated as part of the general picture, but less exhaustively.



The discussion is divided into two chapters. The first examines the sources of psywar intelligence in FEC, i.e. what the producers of psywar have with which to work. The second chapter examines the production of psywar intelligence from those materials, i.e. what the producers of psywar intelligence do, and what their output is like.



SOURCES OF PSYWAR INTELLIGENCE

The Intelligence and Evaluation Division of PWS receives and processes a large volume of documentary materials. It does not itself "collect" intelligence (although one PWS chart appears to allocate this function to it⁵), if by this is meant actual procurement of raw data. It works, that is to say, with data gathered by other agencies for other purposes, and merely routed to, among other places, PWS. Its task is to winnow out of such data those that seem, in the light of its criteria, relevant to the conduct of psywar, then fit them into one or another of the several documentary series which represent the Division's output (see the following Chapter) and upon which, in theory at least, psywar planners and operations personnel depend for intelligence support.

The regular routine flow of source materials for the PWS Intelligence operation consists, in the main, of daily and weekly news publications, press releases, radio messages, prisoner of war interrogation reports, agent reports, intelligence summaries, foreign radio broadcast reports, translations of captured enemy documents, and miscellaneous reports and documents.

These main types of source material are described in the following sections, where an attempt is also made to estimate their utility for current psywar intelligence operations in FEC.

News Publications

The newspapers that PWS Intelligence regularly receives are without exception English-language publications. Five of them, the *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, the *Nippon Times*, the *Osaka Mainichi*, the *Japan News*, and the *Singapore Straits-Times*, originate in the Far East. Two of them, the *New York Times* (airmail edition) and the *Christian Science Monitor*, are dailies from the ZI. The news weeklies, *Time* and *Newsweek*, both come from the ZI.

The first four newspapers on the above list are screened by intelligence analysts on the date of issue or the day following, primarily for fresh news of events behind the Iron Curtain, items likely to be of use in refuting enemy propaganda, and items revealing enemy psywar vulnerabilities. The fifth of the Far Eastern dailies, the *Singapore Straits-Times*, does not reach PWS until several weeks after publication. In spite of its tardiness, however, it is a

⁵ PWS organizational and functional chart, July 1951.

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fruitful source of information about Asian affairs and, especially, about Hong Kong and China. According to the Division's personnel, the *New York Times*, which though it comes by air mail reaches its analyst's desk a full week after publication, is relied on as the most thorough and dependable foreign coverage available. The *Christian Science Monitor*, issues of which reach Tokyo two weeks after their date of publication, is screened for background material; so also are *Time* and *Newsweek*, whose "spread" articles, according to the Division's personnel, bring together, on a given topic, much information not likely to reach Tokyo in any other form.

The Division does not maintain archives of newspapers, or even a file of newspaper clippings. It makes briefs of items that it deems relevant to its interests, and discards the publications from which they are drawn.

News Releases

Besides the foregoing newspapers, PWD Intelligence receives all news releases issued by Civil Information and Education of SCAP, and makes heavy drafts on them in preparing its own output.

It is not, as might be expected from the foregoing paragraphs, a function of the Intelligence Division to assemble the materials out of which PWS's propaganda writers can build news broadcasts and news leaflets. The 1st RB&L Group has its own news desk, which receives the complete file of several news wire services, and attempts, by means of them, to keep the Group's writers abreast of the world's news. The Intelligence staff seeks rather to provide the propaganda writers extra bits of information—the obscure but relevant items the news desk is unlikely to have noticed, the hard-to-find background datum that, for example, *Time* is more likely to come up with than the United Press, the touch of "human interest" that lies buried in a lengthy quote—that might make a news broadcast sound more authoritative, or help a news commentary to capture and hold attention.

Radio Messages

PWS Intelligence receives a continuous flow of official radio messages, which come variously from the Department of State in Washington, from United States embassies, legations, consuls, attaches, or from Army, Navy, and Air Force agencies and installations at points all over the world. These messages appear to furnish much information and comment of the kinds the Division is seeking, on political, economic, and military events occurring in, or affecting, the Far East. Even when classified and thus unavailable for use in propaganda, as frequently happens, this information and comment often gives the Division the jump on its newspapers and news releases: some of it never appears even at a later date, in public news sources, and is useful as background; the rest the Division can process, and have ready to move, when it is released for use by radio and the press.

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Prisoner of War Interrogation Reports

PWS's Intelligence Division draws prisoner of war interrogation data, upon which it relies heavily in its day-to-day operations, from several sources. Of these the most important are EUSAK Field Interrogation Reports, Allied Translation-Interrogation Service (ATIS) Reports, and the psywar interrogation reports section of the EUSAK Psywar Weekly Bulletin. (Interrogation highlights appear also in the general military intelligence summaries, described below, but these tend to repeat, in condensed form, materials obtainable from the EUSAK Field Interrogation and ATIS Reports.)

The EUSAK Field Interrogation Reports are based on interrogations conducted by G-2's Military Intelligence Service Detachment, Interrogation-translation (MISDI), but omit many of the front-line interrogations conducted in Korea. The main ATIS reports, by contrast, cover all such interrogations, including those reported by EUSAK MISDI, but present them in edited form. There is a special ATIS series which reports certain supplementary interrogations, mainly "re-interrogations" conducted by specialists seeking information on particular subjects of long-run interest, e.g. medical services in enemy armies, social conditions in China, etc.

Most interrogation reports reach PWS Intelligence from three weeks to a month after the actual interviews take place on which they are based. However, the interrogations reported in the EUSAK Psywar Weekly Bulletin (EUSAK Psychological Warfare Division's weekly report of its activities), reach PWS with a time-lag of only seven days. Concretely, these reports reproduce, in edited form, excerpts from special interrogations conducted by EUSAK PWD's intelligence staff. The standard EEI (Elements of Essential Information) for front-line interrogations includes only five psywar questions,⁶ and even these are not put to all the prisoners interrogated. EUSAK PWD interrogations, by contrast, are based on a list of 20 or more questions that relate to the central preoccupations of psywar personnel.⁷ Thus, though the ATIS and MISDI interrogation reports run to greater length, the reports incorporated in the EUSAK PWD Weekly Bulletin are, in general, the source from which PWS draws the most reliable and detailed psywar intelligence it has at its disposal. It should be remembered, however, that EUSAK PWD, unlike EUSAK G-2, is able to interrogate only a small number of prisoners.

⁶(1) Did you surrender? If so, why? (2) Did you see any UN leaflets or hear any loud-speaker broadcasts? (3) What did the leaflets look like and/or What did the loudspeaker say? (4) What was the effect on you? (5) Have you heard any talk about leaflets or broadcasts? If so, what was said, and what happened?

⁷EUSAK PWD interrogators currently attempt to avoid direct questions. The guide for interrogators merely sets forth the kind of information required, leaving it to the interrogator to draw the information out of the prisoner by conversational methods. Information sought has to do with such matters as the personnel of the prisoner's unit (percentage of new recruits, percentage of Communists, percentage of ex-CNA or ex-ROK soldiers, etc.), medical treatment in his unit (what happens to the sick and wounded, non-battle casualties in his unit), supplies and food (details regarding meals, clothing, shelter, supporting weapons), treatment after capture/surrender, experience with UN psywar. (Exactly how many leaflets had the prisoner seen? What did he do about them—carry them, discuss them with others, etc.? Did they influence him? How?). See ORO-T-17(FEC), "Eighth Army Psychological Warfare in the Korean War" (SECRET).

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The Intelligence Division searches the interrogation reports for information on a wide variety of topics: the amount and kind of training received by enemy troops, their living conditions (pay, mail, recreation, etc.), food and clothing, health, medical care, and news from home; the enemy's military legal practices (especially with regard to offenses and punishments); friction within the enemy's armed forces; relations between the enemy's officers and his enlisted men; enemy propaganda and indoctrination procedures; desertions from, and insubordination in, the enemy army; and the effectiveness of UN psywar. The information on these topics gleaned from the reports is subsequently subjected to a process of analysis that will be described in the following chapter.

Agent Reports

The Division draws the bulk of its data regarding conditions and developments behind enemy lines from reports incorporating data obtained by agents. One daily series, the Field Research Unit, FEC (FRU/FEC) reports, which reaches PWS only five or six days after issuance, deals mainly with China, on the basis of information supplied by operatives, merchants, travellers, listening-posts, etc. Another series, issued by the FEC Liaison Detachment (FEC/LD), deals chiefly with North Korea, and consists almost entirely of information obtained from agents, line-crossers, and refugees.

From 80 to 100 pages of such reports are received by PWS each week. They contain much detailed military information, some of it readily exploitable for psywar purposes. But the series does not attempt either to summarize or to interpret the developments they report. They record, for example, that such-and-such a cotton mill produces such-and-such quantities, but do not seek to relate this fact to other economic indices in Korea, or to draw inferences from it concerning, for example, the progress of the Korean War.

Intelligence Summaries

PWS receives the following military intelligence summaries: the FEC Daily Intelligence Summary; the daily Periodic Intelligence Reports issued in I, IX, and X Corps; the Pacific Command Weekly Intelligence Digest; and the semi-monthly FEC Intelligence Digest.

The FEC Daily Intelligence Summary, in part because of the promptness with which it is placed in the Division's hands, in part because it is projected on a level of great detail and completeness, in part because it offers evaluations that there is reason to regard as authoritative, figures more prominently than the other intelligence summaries in the Division's activities. It covers military, political, and economic affairs in Japan, Korea, the Philippines, China, and Southeast Asia, with, at present, special emphasis on Korea and China. The military reports, for example, besides presenting a detailed picture of the current military situation, marshal available data on enemy operations

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and enemy capabilities, record enemy gains and losses, and list and analyze all new intelligence bearing upon the identity, location, and movements of enemy units. (It also offers, from time to time, short articles on the status of enemy morale, on psychological warfare vulnerabilities, on the effectiveness of UN psywar, and on enemy propaganda themes. These articles, however, originate either with PWS Intelligence or EUSAK PWD, and are not, properly speaking, grist for the Intelligence Division's mill.)

The Periodic Intelligence Reports (PIR) of the three Eighth Army corps, also published daily, reach PWS from three to five days after issuance. They include much material that PWS has already obtained from other sources (the PIR of one corps typically reproduce anything corps would like to place in the hands of lower commands, and might include, e.g. an extract from another PIR or from the Daily Intelligence Summary, or a section of the EUSAK PWD Weekly Bulletin). Where they overlap with the DIS, however, the PIR's are likely to include details that the DIS omits, and PWS carefully combs them in search of such details.

The Pacific Command Weekly Intelligence Digest, and the FEC semi-monthly Intelligence Digest, deal with the same topics as the FEC Daily Intelligence Summary, but must not be confused with them. Their function is less that of transmitting facts than of analyzing them, and fitting them into relatively broad patterns of meaning. The individual articles, therefore, are more general and speculative than those in the DIS, as the following topics of articles in recent issues indicate: the probability of Communist air intervention in Indo-China; biographical sketches of CCF leaders; CCF intelligence methods; the system of government of the Republic of Korea, and the crucial factors affecting the enemy's offensive potential.

Foreign Radio Broadcast Reports

Among the Division's regular accessions are numerous reports containing—or dealing with—foreign radio broadcast intercepts. These originate for the most part with the US Foreign Broadcast Intercept Service (FBIS). The remainder are produced either by the Japanese Liaison Section of G-2, or by Radio Press, an independent Japanese enterprise which sells its output to interested GHQ agencies.

Five different series of FBIS reports are available to the intelligence staff: a daily monitoring report series, which is moved to PWS by teletype; a daily report series (published in bound volumes); a weekly information abstract series; a weekly statistical content studies series, called "Trends and Highlights"; and a fortnightly analytical survey series. The monitoring reports

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provide word-for-word translations (sometimes entire scripts, sometimes excerpts), condensations, summaries, and breakdowns by topics of broadcasts originating in the USSR, China, Korea, and Southeast Asia and beamed to audiences in the Far East. FBIS's day-to-day monitoring service in the Far East covers the following: all Radio Moscow broadcasts to China, Korea, Japan, Indonesia, Indochina, and Mongolia; broadcasts by Soviet regional stations in the Far East (Magadan, Khabarovsk, Krasnoyarsk, Ulan Bator, Alma Ata, Vladivostok, Petropavlovsk, etc.), domestic as well as foreign, emanating from Radio Peking; broadcasts from regional stations in Communist China (the Chinese Communist radio beams to Southeast Asia, Korea, Mongolia, Japan, Tibet, and North America); almost all North Korean broadcasts (most of these are in Korean, the remainder being in Chinese, English, and Japanese), and a sample of broadcasts from such Southeast Asian countries as Indochina, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Taiwan, and Thailand.

The teletyped monitoring reports mentioned above are the chief raw materials for PWS's routine foreign broadcast analysis. Those in bound volumes are more carefully edited and more systematically organized than are the unbound, but reach the Division as much as two weeks later. The Division accordingly "works" the earlier reports and archives the later ones, which, because they are bound, are easier to store and to use for reference.

The FBIS reports, as noted above, include some verbatim transcriptions, but are largely made up of excerpts or briefs of broadcast materials. FBIS's decisions as to what to include and what to omit, and when to reproduce in full and when to excerpt or summarize, presumably attempt to strike a balance among the interests of its clients, of whom PWS is only one. The resultant priorities appear to run in the following order: (1) items that include data of possible use to US intelligence activities in general, e.g., facts about enemy production; (2) items that illuminate, or reflect changes in, the target's propaganda objectives, and are for that reason of special interest to psywar intelligence; and (3) items, also primarily of interest to psywar intelligence, that indicate the target's distribution of emphasis among important subjects and propaganda themes, and thus reveal both the broadcaster's state of mind (enemy objectives, assumptions, hopes, fears) and what the several radio audiences are hearing.

PWS Intelligence receives three other types of FBIS reports: information abstracts from radio broadcasts, content analyses (in statistical and graphic form), and content surveys (these are discursive, and include interpretation and speculative comment). Two separate information abstracts are issued weekly, one for intercepts from foreign countries in the Far East (mainly, at present, from China and North Korea), a second for intercepts from the USSR and its satellites in Europe. Both address themselves to such topics as industry, trade, transport and agriculture in a given area, and vary between 5 and 10 typed pages in length. PWS

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Intelligence screens them for individual items of potential use as propaganda content, e.g., indications of enemy production failures or declines that might fit into psywar radio commentaries, but not data that might be of use in, for example, constructing a "profile" of the Chinese or North Korean economy.

The broadcast content analyses are also of two types, both of which deal exclusively with Soviet (i.e. not North Korean, nor Chinese) broadcasts: the weekly "Trends and Highlights of Moscow Broadcasts," which charts the emphasis quantitatively given to selected themes, subjects, and geographical areas in Radio Moscow broadcasts (an accompanying commentary, usually brief, makes comparisons between the current period and previous periods, and points up the probable meaning of any shifts in emphasis or propaganda line); and the bi-monthly Survey of USSR Broadcasts, which analyzes and interprets the emphasis and treatment accorded some general subject by Radio Moscow. FBIS content analyses, it should be noted, reach PWS Intelligence from two to four weeks after issuance. Partly for that reason, partly because the analyses do not cover broadcasts from China, North Korea, or Southeast Asia, and partly because even for the USSR the analyses do not cover the entire range of topics and themes in which PWS Intelligence is interested, the latter makes its own continuing content analysis of raw foreign broadcast intercepts.

The other two series—that from the Japanese Liaison Section of G-2, GHQ, and that from a private Japanese concern called Radio Press—also present radio and newspaper comment and opinion⁸ from Far East sources. The major criteria of selection for both are G-2's requirements, not those of psywar. The materials they handle receive fuller treatment in the FBIS reports, but the latter put those materials in PWS's hands at a somewhat later date. Sometimes, therefore, these series enable PWS to spot and use specific propaganda items that would have lost all or some of their value by the time they turned up in FBIS.

Captured Enemy Documents

PWS Intelligence receives reports on and translations of captured enemy documents under the following headings: EUSAK Headquarters, Enemy Documents; ATIS Bulletin, Enemy Documents, and ATIS Supplement, Enemy Documents. The EUSAK Headquarters and ATIS Bulletin publications, which reach PWS a few days after publication, list recently procured enemy documents, describe their contents, and make available translated excerpts and paraphrases of militarily significant portions. The ATIS Supplement offers translations of the full text of selected enemy documents, but only after a delay of as much as six to eight months. If, therefore, EUSAK or ATIS lists a document that seems likely to contain

⁸ Note, in this connection, that the FBIS reports include much news and news commentary transmitted by radio at dictation speed or in code, and thus presumably intended for newspaper use. The foreign radio broadcast content reported is therefore indicative, to some extent, of foreign newspaper content.

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information useful for psywar purposes, PWS Intelligence usually requests it in the original from G-2, and has its own translators render it into English.

Miscellaneous Materials

PWS Intelligence receives and processes, finally, a number of miscellaneous publications: the regular activities reports of UN Civil Assistance, Korea (UNCAK) and Civilian Relief in Korea (CRIK); the Department of State Division of Public Liaison's Monthly Information Sheet; the Department of State Fact Sheet; the GHQ/FEC Counter-Intelligence Review; and special pamphlets and publications from the UN and from various U.S. Government agencies, military and civilian.

CONCLUSIONS

Several conclusions seem warranted by the data set forth in the foregoing paragraphs.

Most of the intelligence PWS receives has been collected, in the first instance, with an eye to needs and purposes other than those of psywar. Apart from: (1) those sections of the interrogation reports that deal with responses to the psywar questions included in the interrogation "Elements of Essential Information" (they bear primarily upon the effectiveness of FEC psywar); (2) the EUSAK PWD interrogation reports, which certainly reflect a psywar point of view but tend, insofar as EUSAK and GHQ have different psywar missions, to reflect the former's interests rather than the latter's; and (3) such items as FBIS may include in its reports because PWS is known to be interested in them, PWS is receiving and processing what might be called "traditional" intelligence, not psywar intelligence. Assuming then, that there is such a thing as psywar intelligence, and that PWS's own finished intelligence products belong in that category, they do so, for the most part, because of the way they are selected, out of the total flow of traditional theater intelligence, and processed.

PWS Intelligence devotes most of its efforts to processing relatively raw intelligence data (interrogation reports, foreign broadcast intercepts). For the most part, these data come to it as a result of another (non-psywar) agency's process of collection and selection, which presumably differs from that which PWS would set in motion, if it acquired its own collection-selection operation. It does, however, process much intelligence that it would miss if it relied on the "finished" intelligence reports (intelligence summaries and digests, broadcast analyses) from the other (non-psywar) agencies. G-2, for example, in preparing the FEC Daily Intelligence Summary, necessarily weeds out data which are uninteresting from a strict hardware point of view but are urgently needed by psywar. The time may come when G-2 will automatically

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supply psywar, as it now supplies infantry, the finished intelligence it needs. But G-2 is certainly not in position to do this today, and until it is, there is a strong case for maintaining an intelligence unit within any theater-level psywar organization, and giving it maximum access to available raw intelligence.

PWS Intelligence, in acquiring relatively raw intelligence to process into finished intelligence for the use of psywar planners and operators, appears to have concentrated on sheer volume of input. As will be shown below, PWS Intelligence's output is not—considerations of quality entirely to one side—impressively large, or particularly inclusive as regards subject-matter. A partial explanation for this lies, we believe, in the amount of time and energy that goes into processing the vast flow of relatively raw intelligence described above. PWS Intelligence not only receives, on a recurring basis, what appears to be every scrap of traditional intelligence it can obtain, but continues to process, almost mechanically, the entire flow from each source. The amount of attention it gives to the flow from each source seems to be determined with little or no regard to psywar intelligence pay-off, except as the working-level analysts make their individual adjustments in the light of their individual estimates of probable yield. The Division needs, in this respect, to reconsider its over-all task, and work out systematic arrangements that will minimize the likelihood of searching for psywar intelligence in types of documents in which little usable psywar intelligence has ever been found.

PWS Intelligence makes almost no use of a prime potential source of psywar intelligence, namely, direct and frequent working contacts between its own staff and G-2 officers. Thus, it does not benefit from the knowledge and skills of G-2 personnel except as these find their way into G-2 documents. Nor does it exploit to the full the material in G-2 files as an auxiliary source of psywar intelligence.⁹

The Division has never brought together in a usable intelligence library certain easily procurable background materials on the cultural and psychological peculiarities of the target audience, such as the National Intelligence Survey series, the British Admiralty series, or sociological, anthropological, and political "area studies." Such materials are not, to be sure, necessarily a fruitful source of psywar intelligence. But their use in conjunction with, and as a supplement to, psywar intelligence materials from other sources might enable the Division to give stronger and more frequent support to planners and operators.

⁹ This contrasts with normal practice in Eighth Army PWD. Consult ORO-T-17(FEC).



PRODUCTION OF PSYWAR INTELLIGENCE

The Intelligence Division's analysts, as they seek to extract "psywar intelligence" from the source materials described, select or reject items in terms of their claims to be included in one or another of four types of document which, to all intents and purposes, represent the Division's entire output.¹⁰ These four types are as follows: summaries on psywar effectiveness, summaries on enemy vulnerabilities, analyses of foreign radiobroadcasts, and the "Daily Collation Summary," which covers the entire range of PWS psywar intelligence. In the following pages, each of these four series is discussed and evaluated in terms of: the relation between the effort expended on it and the character, volume, and completeness of the psywar intelligence it embodies; and the relation between the psywar intelligence it embodies and PWS's actual intelligence needs.

SUMMARIES OF PSYWAR EFFECTIVENESS

PWS summaries of the effectiveness of PWS-supervised psychological warfare, like the summaries of enemy vulnerabilities, are based on weekly analysis of prisoner interrogation reports. A weekly document, the "Summary of Psychological Warfare Vulnerabilities and Pertinent Data from Prisoner of War Interrogation Reports," contains both summaries.

The analysts, who supply the data for the effectiveness summaries, examine all interrogation reports PWS receives in a given week, extracting and recording, on specially prepared forms, the following data concerning each prisoner: the number of the report in which the POW's interrogation appears; the date of his capture; his age, rank, and organization; whether responses to the psywar Elements of Essential Information appear in the report; whether the prisoner saw or heard UN propaganda, and if so, in what form (leaflet, loudspeaker, voice plane); whether the prisoner was influenced by UN propaganda; whether the prisoner surrendered as a result of UN propaganda; and whether the prisoner offered comments upon any of 17 topics (see below) relating to enemy vulnerabilities.

¹⁰ Exceptions to this statement are noted further on in the section entitled "Other Intelligence Products."

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The data on Chinese prisoners are segregated from those on Korean prisoners, to facilitate preparation of the Division's weekly tabulations of psywar effectiveness for each of the two armies, and the weekly reference guides to the interrogation reports having to do with their respective psywar vulnerabilities.

The first five items on the Survey form (report, number, date of prisoner's capture, his age, rank, and organization) serve as a necessary precaution against counting the same prisoner twice. Some interrogation reports, according to the Division's analysts, are re-interrogations, but offer no indication of this fact. The same prisoner may therefore appear in as many as three different reports, each differently numbered, and without cross-referencing of any kind. There is, moreover, no settled practice as regards the romanization of Chinese and Korean names. The same name may appear, for example, as Chiang Ping one place and Jang Bin another; or Hsia, Chi Wu may be the same man as Sia, Ju Woo. To avoid duplication, this makes it necessary to include (and file responses under) the supporting identification data.

A rough sampling of the weekly Survey forms for October and November 1951 indicates that as many as half of the interrogation reports contain no prisoner responses to the questions on the psywar EEI. (Did you surrender? If so, why? Did you see any UN leaflets or hear any loudspeaker broadcast? What did the leaflets look like and/or what did the loudspeaker say? What was the effect on you? Did you hear any talk about leaflets or broadcasts? If so, what was said and what happened?) Such reports seldom state, moreover, whether the questions were asked and were answered in the negative, or were asked and not answered, or were never asked at all. PWS's practice, of treating no-response prisoners as prisoners not influenced by psywar, must be kept in mind in evaluating its estimates of effectiveness, which, for the reason stated, have a deliberate bias against the conclusions PWS would presumably prefer to believe correct. For other prisoners, the Survey form records: the number who saw (or did not see) leaflets or heard broadcasts or both; the number who state that they were (or were not) influenced by what they saw or heard; and the number who surrendered (or did not surrender) as a result of having been so influenced.¹¹

Any judgment as to whether the Division's continuing analysis of psywar effectiveness is worth the time and effort expended on it must take into account certain characteristics inherent in the data analyzed, i.e., in the interrogation reports themselves. The reports can be accepted at face value, and the "facts" they contain filed as reliable psywar intelligence, only if the following assumptions are made about the prisoners: (1) that they understand the questions; (2) that they know the answers to the questions; (3) that they can articulate these answers; and

¹¹See Appendix A for a table summarizing PWS Intelligence's conclusions as to effectiveness, May-October 1951.

[REDACTED]

(4) that they are answering truthfully. These assumptions, especially in respect to such questions as "Why did you surrender?" and "What was the effect on you of the leaflet you saw?," are justified only to the extent that the relevant interrogations are conducted in the context of certain safeguards against bias, the application of which by contemporary social scientists, for example, calls for long and thorough professional training. These safeguards are certainly not applied in the interrogations underlying the reports that PWS receives and processes.

Unavoidable negative implications, with respect to the Division's continuing study of psywar effectiveness, emerge clearly from the following evidence as to what is involved in counting, as surrenderers, all prisoners whose interrogation reports list them as having surrendered. G-2 of GHQ, FEC¹² reported 663 prisoners received, in the month's period from 10 September to 9 October 1951. According to G-2, whose figures are drawn from the reports of receiving officers, 609 of the men had been captured (92 percent of the total) and 54 had "deserted" (8 percent). PWS Intelligence's files¹³ contain interrogation reports for 136 of the 663 which, as interpreted by the Division, point to 66 of the 136 as "captured" and 70 as having "deserted." In short, PWS accounts 51 percent of its sample as "deserters," as against the G-2 figure of 8 percent for the total number of prisoners. PWS, indeed, found more deserters among its one-fifth of 663 than G-2 had found among all the prisoners taken during the period in question. This is not to suggest that G-2's count is correct and PWS Intelligence's count incorrect, but rather to call attention to the facts that a theater-level psywar intelligence operation, as conceived in FEC, is not in a position to reinterpret the interrogation reports it receives (it must accept them at face value), and that this casts grave doubt on the resultant calculations of effectiveness, no matter how cautiously they are derived.

Certain further considerations, bearing upon the process by which the Division estimates the effectiveness of UN psywar, point to similar conclusions. The Division's continuing analysis of interrogation reports yields, at best, an estimate of the effectiveness of only one phase of current psywar operations, not of these operations in their entirety. The reports yield data only on the impact of air and ground loudspeaker voicecasts and leaflet drops to enemy troops. They are silent about UN radio broadcasts, and about leaflet drops to civilians in enemy-held territory; and PWS has at its disposal no comparable source to which it can turn for data bearing upon these two important phases of its operations.

The interrogation reports deal only with that sample of enemy troop populations which falls into UN hands, and tend to assume that the sample is representative of the populations. In other

¹²Telecon #789, 19 Oct 1951, GHQ, FEC.

¹³Document in PWS Intelligence files, dated 30 Oct 1951.

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words, the Division's estimate of effectiveness is drawn from a group in which the enemy soldiers who have been affected by UN psywar are likely to appear, and in which enemy soldiers who have not been affected are unlikely to appear.

The analysis fixes almost exclusive attention upon the effectiveness of UN psywar in inducing surrender-behavior. To the extent, therefore, that UN psywar has other objectives, or produces behavioral results other than surrender as by-products of its surrender-objective psywar, the analysis is necessarily an inadequate measure of psywar effectiveness.

The analysis does not, in its present form, reach any conclusions concerning the effectiveness of specific psywar themes or demarches. Particular leaflet drops, for example, are seldom if ever related to the date and place of capture of prisoners interrogated, so as to enable generalizations (even within the limits noticed above) about effectiveness that would show, e.g., what types of leaflets do and what types do not pay their way. It would be possible, from information recorded on the Survey form, to rearrange the data according to date of capture and organization (data on the latter can easily be translated into geographical terms); this information might be put together with what can be gathered from the interrogation reports about propaganda content reaching prisoners (which is admittedly very inadequate); and the above might be related to known psywar operations and/or themes. This would permit conclusions about psywar effectiveness at least as trustworthy as those now reached by PWS Intelligence, and certainly more suggestive and useful to psywar planners and operators.

The present type of analysis thus fails in what many would regard as its primary mission: that of advising the psywar staff about what it needs to do in order to make psywar operations more effective. The analysis does not, in other words, serve FEC Psywar as a basis for genuine self-criticism in terms of effectiveness. It merely reassures PWS that, according to available data of uncertain validity, psywar reaching enemy troops is effective enough to produce discernible results.

The "effectiveness" data recorded on the Survey of Prisoners of War form described above is further reproduced, in tabular form, in the "Weekly Summary of Psychological Warfare Vulnerabilities and Pertinent Data from Prisoner of War Interrogation Reports." The latter, which unlike the Survey is widely distributed in PWS, lists the following: the number of prisoners interrogated; the number who observed or heard leaflets or broadcasts, or both or neither; the number, in each category, who either were influenced and surrendered as a result, or were influenced but did not surrender as a result, or were not influenced. (A sample report from the Summary appears in Appendix A.) Along with the tabulation, the weekly Summary presents excerpts from interrogation reports, under the heading of

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"Prisoner's comments concerning circumstances of capture, desertions, and/or 'surrender'," which usually include all prisoner comments on psywar "effectiveness" to be found in the week's "take" of material. These excerpts are also filed in a permanent folder on psywar effectiveness, where they can be consulted as needed.

On the basis of the tabulation, the excerpts, and, very often, the special psywar interrogations reported by EUSAK PWD, a short but discursive weekly summary (see the Appendix) on the effectiveness of psywar is prepared, as a service to G-2, for the G-2 GHQ Daily Intelligence Summary. This report is reproduced in the PWS Daily Collation Summary as well. As an analysis of psywar effectiveness it has, of course, the strengths and weaknesses of the tabulation on which it is based.

SUMMARIES OF ENEMY VULNERABILITIES

PWS's analysis of prisoner of war interrogation reports, as described above, also furnishes data for its weekly summaries of enemy "vulnerabilities." The process by which these summaries are produced is as follows:

PWS Intelligence maintains a list of "vulnerabilities," each of which serves simultaneously as a mandate to analysts to keep on the lookout for data of a certain kind and as a research category under which such data can be filed as they appear. The list includes the following items: the amount and kind of training received by enemy troops; their living conditions (pay, mail, recreation, etc.); their food, clothing, health and medical care; the news they get from home; the enemy's military legal practices (especially as regard offenses and punishments); friction within the enemy's armed forces; relations between the enemy's officers and his enlisted men; the enemy's propaganda and indoctrination procedures; desertions from and insubordination in the enemy's army; relations between enemy troops and civilians; and friction between Chinese and Koreans.

The interrogation reports are read for information bearing upon these topics. If a prisoner is reported as having commented on a certain "vulnerability," this fact is duly recorded (via a check mark in the appropriate column of the same survey form noted above in the discussion on effectiveness). The comments, as with those on psywar effectiveness, are then excerpted for reproduction, under the appropriate heading, in the weekly Summary of Psywar Vulnerabilities. Sometimes the process includes actual tabulation of the comments reported on specific vulnerabilities, so that, for example, the number of indications of low enemy morale can be included in the summary, with a breakdown showing how they divide among such subheadings as low morale because of insufficient food, low morale because of fear of UN artillery and air power, etc.¹⁴

¹⁴ Some other sub-headings are: overwork, lack of medical aid, casualties.

[REDACTED]

Usually, however, the comments are merely set forth in brief individual summaries, as in the following examples taken from the 30 November 1951 Summary:

"A North Korean private from the 3d Regiment, 15th North Korean Division, said that because the morale in the 8th and 9th companies was so low, the officer watched the men so closely that they had to feign interest in fighting." (KT-2343)

"A sergeant said that three men from each company of the 1st Regiment, 15th Division, had recurrent fever but there was no medicine available for treatment. Each man had only a roll of bandage, and the drinking water was not purified according to the sergeant." (KT-2420)

"A private in the 124th Division, 42d CC Army, reported receiving two meals of rice a day in sufficient quantities. He also said that each man carried 10 kilograms of uncooked rice as a combat ration." (KT-2458)

"A private from the 191st Division, 64th CC Army reported that the men in his unit had not tasted meat or rice for several months. He added that the food was sufficient in quantity but the taste of it made the men sick." (KT-2455)

Besides appearing in the Weekly Summary of Vulnerabilities, the comments excerpted from the interrogation reports are filed in appropriate folders, under their various headings. Thus PWS Intelligence files now contain a wealth of material on, e.g., health, or food and clothing, or frictions between troops and civilians, in the form of prisoner's remarks. Up to the present time, however, no use appears to have been discovered to which such information can be put. No attempt is made to assess the general situation with respect to the vulnerabilities in question, to compare the present situation (with respect to a given vulnerability) with the situation at some earlier moment, to establish trends, to attempt (in any manner whatever) to anticipate future developments, or even to catalog data by units in the enemy's armed forces.¹⁵ The reports take notice again and again, for example, of complaints about the inadequacy of food; at no time, however, does the reader of the reports receive any help in forming any save the most impressionistic judgment as to whether food conditions in North Korean armies are better or worse than in the Chinese, as to whether one unit is better or worse off than another one, as to whether the situation in each army appears to be deteriorating or improving, and, above all perhaps, as to how much and why it matters what the food situation is.

In short, the "analysis" of enemy vulnerabilities is, in fact, an information-gathering process. The task of piecing together from prisoner information a coherent and trustworthy picture of enemy "morale" is not, on the record, one that falls within the Division's mission as it is now understood. If, for

¹⁵EUSAK PWD, on the other hand, files such data according to the relevant unit. See ORO-T-17(FEC).

[REDACTED]

example, it were called upon for advice as to the probable vulnerability of enemy troops to such-and-such a proposed psywar message, the PWS Intelligence staff would, if able to deal with the request at all, be forced back upon the accumulated but undigested data in its archives. In other words, the continuing study of enemy vulnerabilities conducted in the Intelligence Division does not, and in its present form cannot, answer questions about whether PWS or its subordinate psywar agencies are hitting the right audience with the right message at the right time, vulnerability-wise. Still less does the Division perform its functions in such fashion that planners and operators can turn confidently to its output for guidance in elaborating themes that make the most of current vulnerabilities.

PWS Intelligence is not often called upon for advice of the kind envisaged in the foregoing paragraph. Observation of the PWS planning process shows that decisions as to what themes are to be emphasized in FEC propaganda are made, in general, without much attention to known (as contrasted with suspected) vulnerabilities. Mostly the decisions appear to be made on grounds having nothing to do with vulnerabilities at all, and not affected by variations in vulnerabilities as these might be inferred from the Intelligence Division's reports. Broadly speaking, the questions that figure most prominently in PWS planning deliberations and, as answered at any particular moment, do affect decisions as to what themes to emphasize, seem to be like the following: What propositions about the UN, or Communism, or cease-fire deadlocks, etc., would we like the audience to accept? From what we know about soldiers in general, and on the basis of our judgments about the situation of these troops in particular (e.g., they are probably always short of food, their medical care is probably inadequate, winter is coming and they will probably suffer, they are probably afraid of our firepower, etc.) what are the things we need to go on telling enemy troops to induce them to surrender? What new and better twists can be made use of in telling them? What is the enemy, in his "I & E" program and over his radio, saying about us, about the war, and about our propaganda that we need to counter somehow? How can we counter it without appearing to enter into a debate with the enemy propagandists, and without lending our media to his dissemination purposes?

Over and above the fact that PWS's analysis of "vulnerabilities" relates only to the troop audience and, even within that sphere, is of limited utility for reasons already stated, one further point is in order. At best, the information selected and reproduced in the "analysis" is primarily situational in character. To the extent that it tells PWS anything, it tells it what the enemy soldier's food situation is like, what his relations with officers are like, how he is fixed for military equipment, how much work he does, how much training he has, and so on. The analysis of "vulnerabilities" does not and is not intended to

[REDACTED]

provide "cultural" intelligence. It does not, in other words, shed any light whatever upon the kind of question that arises in propaganda operations by virtue of the fact that they are addressed to individuals of a culture more or less different from that of the propagandist: what sort of human being is the enemy soldier, not as a soldier but as a Korean or Chinese citizen? How does his behavior, in a given situational context, differ from that of Americans? How do his thoughts, his feelings, likes, dislikes, traits, habits, etc., differ from those of his counterpart in another culture? Such information as PWS Intelligence can provide along these lines is, in part no doubt because of its concentration on vulnerabilities of the limited kind indicated above, highly impressionistic in character. Preparing a profile of PWS's psywar audiences, i.e. an orderly and understandable description of major characteristics that leaflet and script writers could turn to in their attempts to tailor their products to distinct audiences, is yet another task that does not fall within the Division's mission as PWS interprets it. The information that would go into such profiles, insofar as it is available in PWS at all, originates not in the Intelligence Division, but rather in the Plans and Policies Division, which includes one Chinese and one Korean advisor, and they are the source of what "cultural" intelligence PWS planners and writers have at their disposal.¹⁶

ANALYSES OF FOREIGN RADIO BROADCASTS

PWS's intelligence activities in respect to foreign radio broadcasts result in two major types of product: charts showing the frequency distribution of "themes" in foreign broadcasts, and narrative reports on "trends" in foreign broadcast content. Both are produced for each of the four areas of concern to PWS: the USSR, Communist China, North Korea, and Southeast Asia.

A frequency chart (charts are published weekly and monthly for Soviet broadcasts, monthly for each of the other areas) shows

¹⁶The PWS Plans and Policies Division is, at the time of this writing, planning the preparation of target-group profiles for each of the four major targets for PWS propaganda: CCF troops in Korea, NKA troops, Korean civilians in enemy-held territory, and Korean civilians in "friendly" territory. Some of the major headings under which the profiles will be assembled, according to present plans, are: sub-groupings within the target audience, educational and literary levels within the target audience, target audience familiarity with current events, target audience's "picture" of other countries, its prejudices, its degree of ideological awareness, its access to radios, the obstacles it must surmount in order to receive UN propaganda, its attitude toward its own civil and military authorities, the nature of the training offered to its troops, etc.

A completed profile will offer, in succinct form, the main considerations (factual where facts are available, presumptive where facts are not available and yet some premise about the target audience must be adopted) that radio and leaflet writers must keep in mind in order to tailor their output to the intended recipients.

The Division's high-level personnel regard the need for such profiles as notably greater now than in the past because, with the arrival of the 1st RB&L Group last August, numerous operational functions went into the hands of personnel without previous experience in the Far East.

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for the specified period the number of broadcast intercepts relating to each of certain "themes." The themes have varied in number, over the past six months, between 30 and 60 for each area, partly because one month's content may differ from another's in a way that calls for a different theme breakdown, and partly because the degree of detail with which the analysis is conducted necessarily varies from time to time and analyst to analyst. (If, for example, the analyst is overloaded with work, he may handle all atrocity charges under a single theme heading.)

The charts usually distinguish between overseas and domestic themes, and, as time and resources permit (to date for Soviet broadcasts only), between "themes" broadcast in different languages from any one source. This enables comparisons between "theme" frequency in, for example, Soviet radio programs transmitted to China, and "theme" frequency in Soviet transmissions to Japan, or Korea, etc.

The Foreign Radio Broadcast Trends reports, one or two pages in length, are produced at the rate of 60 to 80 per month (almost daily, on the average, for the USSR and China). Approximately two-thirds of them currently deal with Soviet or Chinese broadcasts, and the remainder with Korean broadcasts and broadcasts from countries in Southeast Asia.¹⁷

The trend reports attempt both to describe and evaluate the significance of current foreign (especially "enemy") radio propaganda. They are reproduced in the G-2 Daily Intelligence Summary, and are not widely circulated within either PWS or the 1st RB&L Group. Radio script writers, for example, hardly ever see them (as recently as November 1951 the Research and Development Section of the Group was keeping an analyst busy duplicating the broadcast analysis conducted by the Intelligence Division in PWS); they appear, in point of fact, to have been designed with an eye to the needs of the Plans and Policies Division. Since, however, foreign radio broadcast materials claim more full-time analysts than the prisoner of war interrogation materials, trend reports, together with the frequency charts, merit careful attention in connection with an attempt to evaluate PWS psywar intelligence output. The principal considerations involved appear to be the following:

1. The charts, which are based on the FBIS intercept reports described in the first part of this memorandum, reflect the limitations of FBIS's own program. FBIS interception provides selected, not complete, broadcast coverage: it assigns top priority to Radio Moscow's foreign-language broadcasts, a somewhat lower priority to those of Radio Pyongyang and Radio Peking, and a relatively low priority (much too low, in the opinion of PWS analysts) to Soviet domestic broadcasts, which it merely samples. The charts therefore vary greatly in reliability; the chart for Southeast Asia, based on much smaller and less systematic coverage, is necessarily

¹⁷ In October 1951, for example, 24 of the FRBTs dealt with the Soviet radio, 21 with the Chinese, 15 with the Korean, 5 with the Indochinese, and 2 with the Indian.

[REDACTED]

less reliable than that for Radio Moscow, although it bears on its face no indication that this is so.

2. The charts, for the reason just noted, reflect to a considerable extent FBIS's breakdown and treatment of broadcast materials, which are not necessarily those for which PWS current interests call, at a given moment. FBIS materials sometimes reproduce verbatim texts; sometimes they paraphrase, condense, or summarize; sometimes they merely list topics touched on.

3. The charts present a general picture of the content of foreign broadcasts beamed to the Far East, but do not enable PWS to form an instructed judgment as to what propaganda is aimed at specific audiences. They do not, for example, tell other PWS divisions what themes are being addressed to Koreans from all sources, which means that PWS's propaganda writers for Korea are not given an accurate picture of the propaganda its competitors are addressing to that country. If, for example, Chinese psywar stepped down the incidence of discussion of cease-fire negotiations in Korean language broadcasts and at the same time stepped it up in broadcasts in other languages, the charts could not be counted upon to call the fact and meaning of the change to the attention of PWS planners and writers.

4. The charts—weekly and monthly for the USSR, monthly for China, North Korea, and Southeast Asia—do not show variations in theme frequency within each period, or from one period to the next. (FBIS, by contrast, makes a regular practice of plotting broadcast emphases in any period against some kind of average, subject by subject, or against past fluctuations, subject by subject, so that shifts of attention are readily perceptible. This material does not reach the other divisions.)¹⁸ Charts that do show such variations, when they are produced at all, are produced *ad hoc*, over and above the regular series. (In May 1951, for example, a graph was prepared to show the incidence of atrocity charges in Soviet broadcasts to the Far East from February to May 1951.)

5. The charts break broadcast content down, not into propaganda themes alone, but also, and primarily, into the "subject" of the broadcasts (their focus of attention). "Western imperialism and aggression" and "world peace offensive" are, recognizably, propaganda themes: "The West is imperialist; we Communists, however, are peace-loving." "Pacific pacts" however, is not a propaganda theme, nor is "Truman-Shvernik exchange," "Youth festival," or "Economic and social conditions in Japan," or "Iran," or "Yugoslavia."¹⁹

6. The categories selected for the charting of broadcast content are not only disorderly and inconsistent, as pointed out in the preceding paragraph, they offer quite inadequate safeguards

¹⁸ The FBIS charts, however, as previously noted, cover only a few subjects or themes, and this only for broadcasts from the USSR. They are not, therefore, substitutes for the broadcast analysis conducted in PWS.

¹⁹ Examples of topics plotted in November 1951 charts.

[REDACTED]

against overlapping and duplication of categories. A broadcast dealing with the Iranian oil crises may have been counted only once (under "Iran," or under "Frictions among non-communist power," or under "Western imperialism and aggression"), or it may have been counted under two or even three headings. The Division, in short, has no settled policy as to whether the analysts are counting one "theme" per broadcast item, or all "themes" that happen to appear in a given item.

7. The Foreign Radio Broadcast Trend (FRBT) reports follow no consistent pattern. They report broadcast treatment of specific subjects, e.g., "'North Korean and Viet Nam prisoners to be used as atomic guinea pigs,' says Moscow"; "Moscow renews charges of racialism"; "Indonesian economy dislocated by export ban re China"; "UN troop morale"; "Sino-Soviet friendship eternal"; "Japanese prisoners held by US"; "Purpose of General's visit to Tokyo"; "Sino-Soviet economic and cultural cooperation"; and "Opposition to ratification of Japanese peace and security treaties."²⁰ Only rarely do they identify and analyze a "trend" (in the usual sense of this term), i.e. an emergent theme or subject, a new handling of an old theme or subject, or an increase or decrease in the number of broadcasts devoted to a given theme or subject. Sometimes they report straight intelligence, e.g., "Indonesian economy dislocated by export ban re China"; "Chinese confess failure of revolution among peasants." They present illustrative quotations, paraphrases, or summaries of the broadcast content, along with brief commentaries on its significance.

8. A review of the FRBTs issued during October 1951 shows that the analysis of broadcasts in these reports addressed itself to three main questions:

What is foreign propaganda up to? What, for example, is Moscow Radio saying to our troops and allies (us), and to its own friends and allies (our targets)? Why? The FRBT report of 30 October 1951, on Soviet charges of racialism, read in part:

"The Soviet Union is apparently attempting to use racial consciousness to create dissension among UN troops and to disrupt friendly relations between the US and Japan.

"Broadcasts to China contrasting the American racial discrimination with Soviet 'egalitarians' are probably intended to strengthen the friendship between the Chinese and Russian people, and at the same time, help keep anti-American feeling at a high level."

What might be surmised, from what foreign propaganda is trying to get its audience to think or do, about the source's other intentions and activities? The FRBT of 30 October 1951, on a North Korean broadcast on the expansion of guerilla

²⁰ FRBTs on USSR, 1-15 October 1951

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units in South Korea, for instance, concluded with the following comment:

"It is quite probable that the guerillas have not been producing the desired results and this broadcast is an effort to increase their activities."

What might be surmised from foreign (enemy) broadcast content about enemy psywar vulnerabilities? The 31 October 1951 report, on a radio speech by Mao Tse-tung, commented as follows:

"A plea for unity at this time may indicate that 'the people's democratic dictatorship' is challenged by widespread doubt and dissatisfaction re its domestic totalitarian policies and its avowed crusade against the Western powers."

It should be clear from the foregoing analysis that the FRBT reports, much more than the frequency charts, approach the treatment of foreign radio broadcast material that a theater-level psywar operation clearly needs. The charts, at best, offer elementary and limited analysis of foreign broadcast content. The reports provide PWS planners with intelligence they can and do use: more or less adequate accounts of enemy propaganda treatment of an event or an aspect or phase of the war, and thus enable planning to be conducted with a certain degree of awareness of what the enemy is saying.

DAILY COLLATION SUMMARY

The Daily Collation Summary, far more than the other products of PWS Intelligence: (1) exploits all intelligence sources available to the Division; (2) levies, directly or indirectly, on the time and energies of all Division personnel; and (3) offers coverage on every phase of the Division's work, including the analysis of enemy vulnerabilities, that of foreign radio propaganda, and that of psywar effectiveness as these were described above. It can, therefore, be regarded as the supreme example of the psywar intelligence function as it is understood and practiced in PWS. The present section will describe the Summary,²¹ analyze the process by which it is produced, and estimate its utility to PWS planners and operators.

The DCS normally appears every day except Sunday. It is in mimeographed form, the average issue running to some 15 legal-size pages and including some 40 items, 5 or 6 lines in length on the average, each of which appears under a country heading and a subject-matter sub-head.²²

The DCS issues for the month of October 1951 show the following average geographical distribution of items: 80 percent have to do

²¹ PWS Command reports describe it as a collection of "significant intelligence items relating to enemy vulnerabilities and trends within both enemy and friendly countries."
²² The sub-heads, taking the Korean-Chinese items for 31 October 1952 as examples, relate country by country, to such topics as lack of food, rationing, morale, pay, confiscation of food, indoctrination of POWs, treatment of POWs, propaganda program, discipline, rail transportation, security organization, puppet forces, Soviet aid, Soviet control, personalities, cease-fire comments.

[REDACTED]

with Korea and China (44 percent Korea, 36 percent China), 8 percent with the USSR and its satellites, 6 percent with Southeast Asia, 4 percent with Western Europe, and the remaining 2 percent with the Middle East, the United States, the United Nations, and Latin America.

The Daily Collation Summary uses directly three full-time analysts, each man specializing in a certain group of source materials which, in PWS theory, he comes to know well, and is thus able to treat systematically. A typical issue is the product of 2 to 3 days' canvassing of source materials by a single analyst, at the end of which process he sits down with 10 to 12 pages of intelligence items which he condenses, rewrites, and labels with appropriate headings.²³ He then submits this first draft to the two other analysts, who eliminate some items on the grounds that they have already appeared in the DCS (a given item may turn up at different times in different source materials), and then passes it on to the Chief of the Division for editing (which often includes striking items out as unsatisfactory or unsuitable) and final approval.

The final version, mimeographed and distributed as The Daily Collation Summary for a single day, is thus made up almost entirely²⁴ of items gathered from a single group of PWS sources by a single analyst.²⁵

The criteria by which items are selected for inclusion in the DCS are derived, in the first instance, from the policy directives prepared by the Plans and Policies Division, many of which have clear implications as to the type of intelligence PWS will shortly be needing. For instance, a directive might be sent to propaganda writers, instructing them to counter Communist talk about "Western decadence;" it tells the Intelligence Division, by implication, to step up the flow of items showing the vigor and spontaneity of Western cultures.

In large part, however, the Division must invent its own criteria as it goes along, in terms of its own (primarily its analysts') estimate of the foreseeable intelligence needs of PWS propaganda planners and writers.

²³ Often the DCS does not condense or summarize intelligence items, but simply identifies and describes them. It may, for example, simply announce that such-and-such a captured document has possible relevance for psywar, and describe its contents in a line or two. Psywar planners and operating personnel can thereupon request further information, or ask the Intelligence Division to obtain the original document and

²⁴ Prepare a more extensive summary or translate all or part of it. Not entirely, because the DCS reproduces, in condensed form: (1) the regular summaries of enemy "vulnerabilities" and of psywar effectiveness discussed above, together with samples of illustrative interrogation items; (2) occasional special articles prepared by PWS Intelligence for the FEC Daily Intelligence Summary (reviews of enemy propaganda, or of enemy countermeasures to UN propaganda); and (3) radio broadcast trend reports (more often, however, the DCS carries actual excerpts from the FBIS reports, as spot intelligence items).

²⁵ Each analyst receives a steady flow of items excerpted, for example, from interrogation reports and radio broadcasting intercepts that other analysts have worked through with an immediate purpose other than contributing to the DCS. All the Division's analysts, whatever their primary responsibility, thus keep an eye on the needs of the DCS, which accordingly, exploits all PWS intelligence sources.

[REDACTED]

The fact that the DCS publishes a datum on some aspect of Chinese production, or an excerpt from a political speech by a Communist leader, or an example of oppressive regulations in North Korea, or a morsel of spot intelligence about enemy troop morale, does not mean that it has received from Plans and Policies a request, explicit or implicit, for information of that character or on that subject. It may mean that the Intelligence Division regards it either as something that might be worked into a leaflet or radio script, or as something that should be taken into account in future PWS decisions as to how, when, and where to hit the audience with what message (e.g., Prisoner X states that UN propaganda, promising good treatment to surrenderers, is too "materialistic"; or, reports indicate that enemy troops are short of writing paper; or, the enemy accuses us of waging bacteriological warfare).

The criteria by which items are selected for the DCS thus reflect, to some extent, the analysts' own estimates of their utility for psywar purposes. Working-level contacts between them and the planners and operators in PWS and in the 1st RB&L Group appear, however, to be infrequent and somewhat casual. Mostly they occur as a result of visits to the Division by leaflet or radio personnel for specific information or materials they hope to find in its files. Nor do any corrective measures appear to have been taken to put the Division's analysts in closer touch with the ultimate consumers of their product. The analysts' notions as to the kind of items that are likely to prove useful for psywar purposes, are, therefore, necessarily vague and impressionistic.

Any assessment of the utility of the DCS as a supplier of intelligence to psywar planners and operators in FEC must take into account the following points:

1. The items included appear without comment or evaluation, either by the originating analysts or their superiors. The former's instructions, as reported to the ORO field team, are to make the DCS as "objective" as possible, to confine themselves to "facts" and avoid "editorializing." The analysts' concrete mission, as they define it, is to get all the "facts" bearing on psywar from the sources made available to them, and to pass them along, in large volume, to the decision-makers and propaganda-writers. The result is that the DCS is, by intention, a vehicle for virtually raw intelligence data, rather than analysis, and that all judgments as to the amount of faith and credit to be given to specific items, or even as to the implications of specific items for the broad intelligence picture, are, as a matter of course, left to the users to make for themselves. The DCS does not perform even the crucially important intelligence function of piecing specific items together into a pattern whose meaning is greater than that of the sum-total of its parts. In other words, it is a venture rather in intelligence collection, than in intelligence production. In producing the DCS, the Intelligence Division

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performs the function not of an intelligence unit but rather that of the "reading panel" within an intelligence unit.

2. The DCS is not intended to minister to its consumers' needs for information about the psychological and cultural peculiarities of target audiences, or for hints as to how to communicate across the cultural barrier that divides Americans from Koreans and Chinese. As noted elsewhere in this memorandum, PWS is not unaware of these needs, and the Plans and Policies Division has, as one of its long-term objectives, the preparation of "profiles" capable of answering many of the questions that leaflet and radio writers must raise as to the kind of human beings they are addressing. But the DCS, in its present form, is not so devised as to be useful, even as a source of support for the preparation of such profiles.

3. The DCS, like the other serial publications of the Intelligence Division, includes little or no material analogous to the "intelligence memoranda" that figure prominently in the output of most intelligence organizations. The claims of these serial publications on the time and energies of the Division's personnel are so great, in point of fact, that little or no time and energy can possibly go into preparing such memoranda. And this means, in practice, that PWS planners and operators are not in a position to call upon the Intelligence Division for exhaustive briefing on topics or problems which, for whatever reason, have suddenly acquired an importance that the Division's current serial publications do not reflect. In its present form, therefore, the DCS and the sister publications actually prevent mobilization of the Division's files and resources behind "hot" requests for support by the planners and operators; and the "Ask Mr. Foster" function of an intelligence unit mostly goes unperformed within PWS proper.²⁶

OTHER INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS

The four types of documents, described above, represent virtually the total output of the Intelligence Division, and their production, as implied, absorbs nearly the whole time of the PWS Intelligence staff. Three other contributions of intelligence personnel to the planning and execution of FEC psywar operations must be recognized, however: the participation by the Chief of the Intelligence Division in weekly planning conferences; the preparation of "research notes" and research memoranda by the Research and Development Section of the 1st RB&L Group (see footnote 26); and the work of the Intelligence Division's target selection officer.

²⁶The so-called Research and Development Section of the 1st RB&L now performs this function, insofar as it is performed at all; e.g., it prepares the regular Research Notes on items listed in the agenda for the weekly planning conferences; it prepares brief research memoranda requested by PWS Plans and Policies or by operating personnel in the leaflet and radio subdivisions of PWS and 1st RB&L.

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PWS conducts weekly planning conferences,²⁷ primarily as part of the process by which it determines the "themes" to be emphasized in leaflet and radio propaganda. Since the Chief of the Intelligence Division is present at these conferences, the conferences provide the Division, in theory, with an opportunity for channelling into the high-level planning phase of psywar operations such of its findings as do not go into its serial publications, and also an opportunity for re-emphasizing the implications of findings that do go into those publications. Such advice as it is able to offer about, for example, probable audience reaction to this or that proposed theme, would presumably be welcomed by the other officers present, and would, as a matter of course, deeply influence the theme-selection process.

Advice of this character does not, however, appear to figure prominently in the conferees' deliberations, chiefly for the following reasons:

1. The planning conferences, as observed by ORO, tend to deal with questions of propaganda policy and strategy in a way that minimizes the probable contribution of intelligence. As previously noted, planning decisions seem to be made only infrequently with an eye to enemy "vulnerabilities" as such. For the most part the conferees address themselves rather to such questions as these: What propositions about the UN, Communism, the Korean War, etc., would we like enemy troops and civilians to accept? What arguments, sound in and of themselves, can we give enemy troops for surrendering? What new and better twists can we use? What can we say that will constitute an intellectually satisfactory answer to this or that well-known and potentially dangerous Communist argument? These questions, moreover, do not tend to be discussed in terms of available information about the enemy troops, but in terms of what the officers present know or believe about human nature, about sound psywar method, about how soldiers, in general, act in combat conditions. These, clearly, are areas which the materials in the Division's files do not—and are not intended to—illuminate.

2. Even when the conference deliberations turn on considerations of a less general character, and questions arise about PWS targets, the Intelligence Chief is ill-equipped, as far as the work his staff actually performs is concerned, to offer much assistance. The intelligence function, as performed by his Division, simply does not produce carefully documented judgments about the target audience's predispositions, its state of mind, the points at which it is vulnerable to psychological attack, or even about the channels by which our communications can reach it. Thus "psywar intelligence" is seldom a major determinant of the kind of broadcasts that are to be made, the kind of leaflets that are to be disseminated, what targets are to be hit with them, and when these targets are to be hit.

²⁷ See, for example, ORO-T-21, "FEC Psychological Warfare Operations: Leaflets."

[REDACTED]

3. The major direct intelligence support for the planning conference is, in PWS theory as well as PWS practice, provided by the 1st RB&L Research and Development Section. This support takes the form of "research notes" dealing with items on the conference agenda (i.e. the proposed themes that are to be discussed). Since each of these notes represents several hours of sustained research on such materials as are available in PWS on the topic at hand, the Chief of Intelligence is not, particularly in the absence of preparatory briefing, in a position to make significant additions to their contents.

The mission of the Research and Development Section of the 1st RB&L Group is to conduct "operations" or "output" research (background research in support of propaganda preparation). This requires, in practice, preparing the regular Research Notes, mentioned above, and brief research memoranda requested by planning and operating personnel.

The function of the weekly planning conference, as noted above, is to give PWS planning officers advice about propaganda themes for possible use against the enemy. A formal agenda for the conference is issued about a week ahead of time, to permit research on the agenda items. The Research Notes, prepared by the Group's R&D Section, are designed to permit the discussion to move from a common background of relevant information, so that prompt decisions can be made without postponements for gathering further background data. They attempt to: (1) answer the question, which unavoidably arises in the course of determining the "availability" of a proposed theme, "Do we know enough about this topic to produce the required propaganda material?"; (2) suggest possible alternative handlings of the proposed theme, thus enabling the conferees to visualize it in less general and abstract terms than those used in the agenda; and (3) furnish advice as to the theme's strengths and weaknesses, together with supporting evidence and argument.

Aside from these research notes for the planning conference, the R&D staff is engaged in conducting, at the request of planners and operators, background research of the type known as "Ask Mr. Foster." Most of these research memoranda are addressed to questions that arise in the course of preparing leaflets and radio scripts. For example: Do the new Chinese marriage laws provide a point of attack for propaganda? What are the facts about working-class living conditions in North Korea? Are the principles of Dr. Sun Yat Sen regarded with veneration by non-Communist Chinese?

The systematic performance of research of this kind is a valuable and, indeed, indispensable activity in psywar, both for leaflets and radio.²⁸ The actual utility of the R&D memoranda is, however, severely limited by the fact that the personnel who

²⁸ Reasons for this, based on a study of FEC psywar more than a year ago, are canvassed in ORO-T-3(FEC).

[REDACTED]

produce them work almost exclusively with unclassified materials, obtained, for the most part, from military and civilian libraries in Tokyo, and do not have access to such basic intelligence materials as the National Intelligence Surveys, the OIR reports, and the British Admiralty series of "area" studies.

R&D personnel do, to be sure, now have access to the PWS Intelligence Division's files.²⁹ These, however, are maintained for purposes other than that of preparing intelligence memoranda, and are not so organized as to lend themselves to R&D's research activities. The files serve as a deposit for such of the Division's primary source materials as it finds it necessary to keep on hand, mostly back-numbers of the various publications it receives, filed sometimes by issuing agency, sometimes by subject, sometimes by country or even date. The filing system used involves a bare minimum of cross-indexing, and tends to reflect not current judgments as to what is efficient, but rather the several storage procedures the Division has used through different periods of its history, so that only someone thoroughly familiar with that history can readily find what he is seeking. For all these reasons, access to the Intelligence Division's files is, at most, marginally useful to the Research and Development staff,³⁰ and the Division's contributions to the direct flow of intelligence to the planning conference and the operators is notably smaller than the scale of its operations would suggest.

The Intelligence Division has recently (mid-December 1951) acquired a "target selection officer," whose task is to step up the flow of intelligence about targets for leaflet operations in North Korea. Target intelligence, not only for leaflet but for radio operations as well, as noted in other ORO studies of FEC psywar, has been conspicuously inadequate.³¹ The addition of a full-time officer on the leaflets' side will, in the opinion of the PWS planners, notably improve the Intelligence Division's performance in this regard. As of late December, the target selection officer was preparing a wall map to show the current disposition and movements of enemy units in North Korea, and had started a unit-by-unit file of information culled from G-2 reports. This should make for more realistic and timely scheduling of leaflet drops than was possible in the past.³²

²⁹R&D, judging from ORO interviews with its personnel, rarely gains access to G-2 files.

³⁰There is, for example, no index that covers all the archived materials. Individual analysts maintain their own lists of materials they are likely to have to refer to, but since no single analyst knows or even sees all the source materials, these lists are unlikely to cover even all the reference materials bearing upon the analysts' specialties. The DCS itself has been indexed for the period since July 1951, and affords a reasonably reliable index of materials received since that date. Normal research procedure is to check the card index for DCS items on the topic in hand, obtain the DCS issues the index lists as relevant to the subject, tease out of the DCS the original sources of each relevant item, and finally, try to locate the desired source materials in the files.

³¹ORO-T-20(FEC), "FEC Psychological Warfare Operations: Radio." ORO-T-21(FEC), "FEC

³²Psychological Warfare Operations: Leaflets."

The scheduling of leaflet dissemination is described in ORO-T-21.



CONCLUSIONS

As has been noted, both explicitly and by implication at several points in the preceding discussion, the Intelligence Division's contribution to the planning and execution of psywar operations in FEC is almost exclusively documentary and formal. The weaknesses revealed by the formal products are not, that is to say, compensated for by personal contacts on the working level. They are, therefore, weaknesses of the PWS intelligence process as a whole.

The weaknesses appear to be due, in the first instance, to excessive and patently unnecessary compartmentalization of the intelligence function. Communication between planning and operating personnel on the one hand, and intelligence personnel on the other, is, for the most part, accomplished "through channels" and by means of documents. This tends, judging from ORO interviews with PWS personnel, to hold contacts to a bare minimum. There is scant opportunity for intelligence personnel to get a clear picture of the needs, wishes, and problems of planning and operating personnel, and for planning and operating personnel to learn what the intelligence staff does and is capable of doing for effective psychological warfare operations. For example, as they are themselves fully aware, working-level intelligence personnel have extremely vague notions as to how intelligence activities fit into the total psywar picture, and what planning and operating personnel actually expect from them.

Intelligence personnel do, to be sure, see the weekly plans and policy guidances as they are issued. Those who work on the Daily Collation Summary have occasion to see the Plans Officer's marginal comments on DCS issues (requests for follow-ups on particular items, for example, or suggestions as to lines of inquiry in connection with current interests). The Chief of the Division is in a position to relay to his subordinates any hints along these lines he may have acquired in planning conferences or in working contacts with the Chief of Psychological Warfare and other PWS officers. But clues of this kind are, at best, unsatisfactory substitutes for the clear and detailed knowledge of operational needs that could be built up in the course of continuous and intimate working relations with planning and operating personnel.

The present situation, with respect to communications between the Intelligence staff and other PWS personnel, is such that some Intelligence staff-members, for example, did not know, when they were interviewed by the ORO field team, that the Plans and Policies Division was preparing "profiles" of the target audience. Some did not know clearly what, if anything, the Research and Development Section of the Group did beyond the fact that its activities were part of the intelligence function. Some knew next to nothing about EUSAK psywar activities, although EUSAK

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psywar is one of the most important DCS clients. Some had so little contact with 1st RB&L Group leaflets and radio personnel that they did not even know their names, although the Group had been in the theater, and in the same building with PWS, for fully five months prior to the time of this writing.

One of the unavoidable consequences of the relative isolation of intelligence activities from other aspects of the conduct of psywar is that the Intelligence Division's products are less useful to their consumers than they might and should be. Another equally serious consequence is that the expertise that the working-level staff necessarily acquires in the course of preparing those products is never tapped directly by the actual participants in the conduct of psywar operations. The machinery necessary for such cooperation does not exist. If it did exist, an opportunity would be created for both groups to do a better job; the working-level intelligence staff would acquire a fuller understanding of its role, and the psywar operations staff would acquire a kind of support it sorely needs, and does not now receive.



IN CONCLUSION

The shortcomings of the Intelligence Division's products result, in large part, from the fact that its personnel are not in position to take and respond to the pulse of its consumers. The Division's analyses of psywar effectiveness, for example, relate only to front-line psywar operations and to their influence in inducing surrenders. PWS planners and operators, however, are at least equally interested in rear area and enemy home front operations, which have little or nothing to do with surrenders. More important still, the analyses are not addressed to the kind of questions about effectiveness that, necessarily, are uppermost in the planners' and operators' minds. These questions have to do not with whether the psywar operation as a whole is getting results (which is what the analyses, in fact, attempt to tell them), but with whether this type of leaflet gets better results than that one, whether this line of argument has convinced more waverers than that one, and other problems of this general character. For the planners and operators are not called upon to decide whether to proceed with the operation as a whole, or whether to place more or fewer resources at its disposal, which is the kind of problem that the results data, as presented by the Division, in fact illuminate. What PWS planners and operators are called upon to decide is whether, given such and such resources, they should be used today as they were yesterday, or should be used differently. Plainly, resources should be withdrawn from efforts in which results are not being obtained, and channeled more generously into efforts in which results are being obtained; equally plainly, decisions as to their allocation are being made, consciously or unconsciously, at PWS, on every working day. But in the absence of results data that discriminate between different lines of effort, PWS must allocate its resources among different lines of effort on the basis either of guesswork or of "intuition." In view of the character of the Division's effectiveness analyses, these are the bases on which PWS planners and operators necessarily are making their decisions about allocation of resources, and must continue to make them until the effectiveness analyses are conceived and executed in different terms.

The Intelligence Division does not, to be sure, at present receive data that would enable it to answer the questions about effectiveness in which the planners and operators are, or should


[REDACTED]

be, interested. The major difficulties, that would have to be eliminated for the planners and operators to receive an adequate flow of the intelligence they actually need, undoubtedly lie outside the Division and at a point in the intelligence process prior, in point of time, to the Division's activities. This is another way of saying that the "psywar intelligence problem," if this is understood as the problem of gathering the intelligence, especially target intelligence, that psywar planners and operators must have if their performance is to be effective, is primarily an intelligence collection problem, which can be solved only by identifying the intelligence needed and expediting arrangements for getting it.

To say, however, that the difficulties occur temporally prior to the Intelligence Division's activities, is not to say that they are logically prior to those activities. The task of identifying the intelligence needed, and of communicating the relevant requirements to the top-level psywar administrators who must negotiate the arrangements for getting them satisfied, can be performed satisfactorily only within the psywar organization, and should, demonstrably, be the major responsibility of the organization's intelligence unit. It is this responsibility that PWS's Intelligence Division fails most conspicuously to perform, in part it seems because of the way in which it interprets its mission, and in part because of inadequate working-level arrangements with planners and operators.

As for the summaries of enemy "vulnerabilities," their utility is limited primarily by the fact that they collect rather than analyze information, a condition which has the unavoidable effect of placing the burden of interpretation and evaluation upon their users. This phase of the Division's efforts, in other words, ends precisely where, if it is to be of maximal benefit to the psywar campaign, it should begin. The analyses of foreign radio broadcasts do present a rough picture of what is being said by competitors of PWS to the Far Eastern peoples. But it takes approximately one-third of the man hours at the disposal of psywar intelligence to produce the analyses, even in their present form, and the ORO field team has found no evidence that planners and operators use them to an extent that justifies an expenditure of effort and resources on this scale.

The Daily Collation Summary, the most prominent of the psywar intelligence products, is also a venture in intelligence collection. It offers its readers data, not analysis, and of it also can be said that ORO found no evidence that it affects operations enough to justify the allotted expenditure of effort and resources. The research notes and research memoranda, by contrast, perform a valuable service for FEC's propaganda writers and planners, and, as far as they go, may be termed indispensable to the rational conduct of psywar. But their preparation is shunted off to a group which not only is located organizationally speaking, outside the intelligence process, but also is not thought of as belonging



to the process. This group, furthermore, much to the detriment of its products from the standpoint of their utility, is obliged to perform its duties without full and automatic access to available classified materials. The conclusion seems inescapable that, despite the contributions of the Chief of Intelligence to the PWS planning conferences, and despite the potential contributions of the new target selection officer, FEC psywar is not now getting, and is not likely to get in the foreseeable future, the intelligence support it needs. This is largely due to the fact that major day-to-day responsibility for producing needed psywar intelligence is lodged in one group, while the powers and facilities for producing it are entrusted to another.



RECOMMENDATIONS

PWS Intelligence should take systematic steps, as should any future psywar intelligence unit, to minimize the likelihood of processing source materials in which experience shows that little psywar intelligence is found. It should, in other words, continuously evaluate the intelligence yield from each type of document it processes. The psywar intelligence unit's objective should be to afford its analysts, as a matter of course, the time they need to analyze such data as they collect from the documents they process, even if this necessitates restricting the flow of incoming documents by eliminating library accessions whose intelligence payoff is disproportionately low.

PWS Intelligence should foster more direct and frequent working contacts between its own staff and G-2 officers (especially those with experience in Korea) to obtain the maximum benefit from G-2 files as a potential source of psywar intelligence, to make the most of the skills and knowledge of G-2 personnel insofar as they are relevant to psywar intelligence problems, and to broaden and deepen the training of its own personnel in the theory and practice of military intelligence.

FEC's summaries of psywar effectiveness, based upon analysis of prisoner interrogation reports, should either be abandoned as a wasteful use of available personnel resources, or replanned in such fashion that they begin to tell psywar planners and operators what they need to know in order to make psywar operations more effective. If the latter course is followed, and if G-2's psywar EEI cannot be enlarged or refined, PWS Intelligence should weigh the wisdom of removing, from its analysts' shoulders, the burden of processing G-2 interrogation reports, and let analysts concentrate instead upon the reports of EUSAK PWD psywar interrogations. Further, the indiscriminate collection of prisoner comments upon "effectiveness" should be abandoned, unless more satisfactory evidence than has been available shows that such collections pay their way.

FEC Psywar Intelligence's quest for enemy "vulnerabilities" should be pushed beyond the point of mere data-collection. Available materials bearing on this topic should be evaluated and assessed so that they can be fitted into a broad picture of the enemy's state of mind and heart, on the basis of which attempts could be made at meaningful comparisons between the enemy units

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that are psywar's potential targets, and at recognizing trends and predicting possible future developments. Attempts should also be made to incorporate data other than those from interrogation reports, in the summaries of enemy vulnerabilities, and to include vulnerabilities other than those of enemy troops.

The detailed analysis of foreign radio broadcasts should, for the present at least, be confined to broadcasts from China and North Korea. (This would mean that PWS would henceforth rely on FBIS reports for coverage of Soviet and Southeast Asian broadcasts.) The categories used for classifying broadcast items should be systematized, even at the cost of increasing their total number, so as to eliminate all uncertainty in deciding where items belong, as well as any disposition to run the item under two or more headings. The charts should be replanned so as to fix attention on what the Korean audience is hearing from all sources rather than on what various enemy propaganda organizations are saying to all their consumers. (This would call for continuous content analysis of all Korean-language broadcasts in the Far East.) The charts should also trace shifts of emphasis, as they occur, in what is on the air in Korea. Interpretation of such shifts should be regarded as a central responsibility of the Intelligence Division.

PWS Intelligence should reconsider the tacit premises that underlay the decision to impose upon the Daily Collation Summary its present character and tone. As a first step in this direction, it should assemble comment and criticism of the DCS from planning and operating personnel at all echelons. The criteria by which DCS items are selected should be more sharply defined. Evaluation and interpretation in the DCS should be encouraged rather than discouraged, and the DCS also should analyze, rather than merely report, information. Should it appear that this is impossible in a daily publication, given the Division's present staff, the DCS should be issued less frequently.

PWS Intelligence should proceed immediately to rearrange its files so as to make them usable for reference purposes. Having clipped potentially useful items, it should discard back issues of all publications that are archived in G-2's files. Finally, it should establish a complete index of the materials in its files.

The production of research notes and research memoranda should be considered a high priority activity. R&D researchers should be given full and automatic access to intelligence materials, or at least access on a basis of full equality with Intelligence Division personnel.

Communication should be intensified within the psywar organization between PWS Intelligence and 1st RB&L Group R&D and between the intelligence personnel in both organizations and their respective planning and operating personnel. Informal meetings might well be held, to discuss problems arising out of the relationship between the producers and consumers of psywar intelligence.

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Intelligence personnel should encourage criticism of their products, and suggestions for their improvement, from the product users themselves.

PWS should move immediately to acquire background materials relating to the cultural and psychological peculiarities of the target audience, and analysts should be instructed and helped to become thoroughly acquainted with such materials. In this connection, PWS should also give intelligence analysts free access to the area advisors in Plans and Policies if necessary, by transferring the advisors, if only for part time, to the Intelligence Division.



APPENDIX A

PSYWAR EFFECTIVENESS





APPENDIX A


PSYWAR EFFECTIVENESS

This appendix consists of three documents relating to PWS Intelligence's reports on psywar effectiveness:

1. A compilation based on PWS Intelligence's weekly analyses of psywar effectiveness for the period (nearly six months) 4 May 1951 to 26 October 1951. PWS's analysis concludes that 67.7 percent of the prisoners for whom comments on psywar were available in interrogation reports received during the period (1078 in all) were "influenced" by psywar and surrendered as a result of having been so influenced.

2. The weekly table of psywar effectiveness for the week ending 30 November 1951.

3. The weekly narrative report on psywar effectiveness for the week ending 1 September 1951.


RESULTS OF PSYWAR EFFECTIVENESS
ANALYSES BY PWS INTELLIGENCE
4 MAY - 26 OCTOBER 1951^a

Psywar Effectiveness Indications	CCF	NKA	Total
Prisoners interrogated	724	758	1482
Commented on psywar	594	484	1078
Observed leaflets	467	422	889
Observed loudspeakers	234	97	331
Observed both	209	94	303
Influenced and surrendered	401	329	730
Influenced but did not surrender	65	37	102
Influenced and surrendered:			
Influenced by leaflets	218	261	479
Influenced by loudspeakers	29	2	31
Influenced by both	151	51	202
Influenced, medium not reported	3	15	18

^aThe figures in the table were compiled from PWS weekly reports; PWS Intelligence extracted and analyzed the information from interrogation reports received during the period covered.

Of the CCF prisoners who commented on psywar, 78.6 percent observed leaflets, 39.4 percent observed loudspeakers, 35.2 percent observed both (these are not mutually exclusive categories). Of the NKA prisoners who commented on psywar 87.1 percent observed leaflets, 20 percent observed loudspeakers, 19.4 percent observed both.

Of the CCF prisoners who commented on psywar, 67.5 percent (55.4 percent of those interrogated) said they were influenced by psywar and surrendered as a result; 10.9 percent said they were influenced but did not surrender as a result; 21.6 percent said they were not influenced.

Of the NKA prisoners who commented on psywar, 68.0 percent (43.4 percent of those interrogated) said they were influenced by psywar and surrendered as a result; 7.6 percent said they were influenced, but did not surrender as a result; 24.4 percent said they were not influenced.

Plough

30 November 1951

SUBJECT: Summary of Psychological Warfare Vulnerabilities and Pertinent Data from Prisoner of War Interrogation Reports.

1. PSYWAR EFFECTIVENESS:

The following summary of information was obtained from Chinese and North Korean interrogation reports received during the week ending 30 November 1951.

<u>BREAKDOWN OF RESPONSES</u>	<u>CHINESE</u>	<u>NORTH KOREAN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1. No. of Officers Interrogated	2	3	5
2. No. of Enlisted Men Interrogated	22	32	54
*3. No. of Multiples Included as Interrogations	2	2	<u>4</u>
4. Total Number Interrogated			63
<u>PSYWAR:</u>			
5. No. Not Questioned About Psywar	10	25	35
6. No. Questioned but Unfamiliar With Psywar	0	1	1
7. No. Who Commented on Psywar	16	11	<u>27</u>
8. TOTAL			63
<u>HOW INFLUENCED:</u>			
9. No. Who Observed Only Leaflets	13	4	17
10. No. Who Heard Only Broadcasts	0	4	4
11. No. Familiar With Both	3	3	<u>6</u>
12. Total Number Contacted by Psywar			27
13. Total of Lines 5 and 6			<u>36</u>
14. Total of Lines 12 and 13			63
<u>INFLUENCED AND SURRENDERED:</u>			
15. No. Influenced by Leaflets Only	9	1	10
16. No. Influenced by Broadcasts Only	0	2	2
17. No. Influenced by Both	0	3	<u>3</u>
18. Total Number Influenced and Surrendered			15
19. No. Influenced but did not Surrender	1	2	3
20. No. Who Commented but were not Influenced	6	3	9
21. Total of Lines 5 and 6			<u>36</u>
22. Total of Lines 18 to 21			63
23. No. of Desertions	5	29	34
24. No. of Captures	12	2	14
25. No. of PWs Who Surrendered as a Result of Psywar			<u>15</u>
26. TOTAL			63

DATE OF CAPTURE: 18 October thru 12 November 1951

SOURCE: Eusak Field Interrogation Reports 164-2603 thru 2621
Atis Interrogation Reports KT-2413 thru 2475

* Multiples are prisoners who surrender in groups and were interrogated as a group.

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UNCLASSIFIED

1 September 1951

EFFECTIVENESS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

This week reports continue to show that the leaflets are the most influential medium inducing surrender. Of three NK PWs who commented on the leaflets, one stated that he had seen them even prior to his conscription in the NKA and that he had always believed their contents. All three credited the leaflets with inducing them to surrender. Of the eleven Chinese who commented, six were positive in their statements that they had been influenced by the leaflets. One, an illiterate who had several of the leaflets read to him by friends, was filled with doubt because of the accusations of dishonor heaped upon the UN by his political officer. Most interesting of the results were those described by a CCF PW (64th Army) who, though illiterate, was a company political officer, and whose assistant political officer was also illiterate. This PW convinced his company commander that, as political officers, he and his assistant ought to know the contents of all UN leaflets found, to better enable them to develop counter-propaganda in their lectures to the troops. The company commander assented and thereafter discussed all leaflets with the PW. Approximately one month later, the company commander deserted the unit, to be followed about a week later, by the PW, the assistant political officer, and nine soldiers. All deserters were later apprehended and returned to their units. (PW did not state whether these included the defected company commander.) Prior to the time of his second desertion, the PW observed many instances in which illiterate soldiers had their literate buddies read the leaflets to them.

SOURCE: 164-MISDI 2312-14
 2323-26 (29 Jul-9 Aug 51)
ATIS KT 1163
 1172-73
 1186-87
 1189 (12-19 Aug 51)
HQ EUSAK Psywar Weekly Bulletin, KGO 385, 21 Aug 51

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